

**Soviet Active Measures  
in the  
"Post-Cold War" Era  
1988-1991**

A Report Prepared at the Request of the  
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### ***Executive Summary***

Active measures is a Soviet term that refers to the manipulative use of slogans, arguments, disinformation, and carefully selected true information, which the Soviets used to try to influence the attitudes and actions of foreign publics and governments. In addition to examining disinformation, this report looks at the Soviet use of conciliatory, alarmist, and derogatory slogans and arguments in order to illustrate the wide variety of manipulative messages and themes used in active measures operations.

Prior to 1988, one type of Soviet active measure message, crude, anti-American disinformation, received the lion's share of attention. During the "post-Cold War" years of 1988 to 1991, the use of this type of Soviet active measure decreased markedly, although it still continued to some extent.

While anti-American disinformation decreased during the late 1980s and early 1990s, another form of derogatory disinformation increased. As the Soviet Communist Party loosened its rigid totalitarian grip within the USSR, it tried to compensate for this by increasing its use of defamatory disinformation against its domestic adversaries, including Russian president Boris Yeltsin, Lithuanian president Vytautas Landsbergis, and other democratic and nationalist opponents of the Soviet Communist Party.

During this period, both at home and abroad, the Soviets placed an increasing reliance on active measures themes that were often very conciliatory, although many also appear to have been disingenuous. For example, in late 1988, the Soviets launched a major active measures campaign designed to create a benign, and false, image of the KGB.

In 1990 and 1991, the Soviets spread alarmist active measures themes energetically, as they attempted to turn to their advantage Western fears about the dangers of a break-up of the USSR. According to a recent defector who circulated active measures for the KGB during this period, the Soviet authorities deliberately sought to influence Western policy by encouraging the belief that if Gorbachev were to lose power or the USSR were to break up, this would lead to the creation of "aggressive republics with uncontrolled access to nuclear weapons."

Also in 1990 and 1991, the Soviet authorities set up an elaborate montage of internal front groups that posed as democratic parties, known as the "Centrist Bloc," led by the so-called Liberal Democratic Party - which was neither liberal nor democratic. In late 1990, the Soviet government floated the idea of forming a coalition government with these bogus parties. They, in turn, formed a National Salvation Committee, called for political parties to be banned, and urged that a state of emergency be imposed in the USSR. This elaborate charade was presumably designed so that the Soviet authorities could appear to be bowing to supposedly popular, "democratic" pressure in imposing a state of emergency. This scheme was partially implemented in the Baltics in January 1991, but soon abandoned. It was resurrected in August 1991 in the form of the abortive hard-line coup, which the Liberal Democratic Party wholeheartedly supported.

But the most pervasive type of active measure during the "post-Cold War" era was exemplified by the conciliatory slogans of "new political thinking." The Soviet "new thinkers" devised 25 to 30 conciliatory slogans with broad, popular appeal, including defense conversion, non-offensive defense, ecological security, the rule of law, a non-nuclear world, eliminating the enemy image, the Common European Home, and a host of others.

The Soviet thinking behind the adoption of "new thinking" was counterintuitive to Westerners. According to the Soviets, Western economic superiority, rearmament, and the specter of a Strategic Defense Initiative with which they could not compete forced them in the mid 1980s to abandon their decades-long effort to gain military superiority over the West. Rather than abandon their ambitious goals in the world arena, however, they made the desperate but audacious decision to try to achieve them by conciliatory, political means rather than the predominately military, confrontational methods of the past. They designed an international strategy based, as Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze put it, on the "force of politics" rather than the "politics of force."

Soviet active measures and propaganda specialists, elevated to new prominence and power within the USSR, creatively devised the supra-Marxist ideology of "new political thinking," which sought to use the worldwide appeal of "all-human" values and concerns as a vehicle for achieving Soviet leadership internationally. The Soviets designed political campaigns centered around "all-human" fears about nuclear war, environmental catastrophe, and the collapse of the world economy, and used the immense resources of the Soviet active measures apparatus to propagate these themes worldwide.

Whereas Marxist "old thinking" was, in many ways, the politics of confrontation and envy, with its central paradigm the struggle of the economically oppressed versus their oppressors, "new thinking" relied much more heavily on both the politics of conciliation and what might be called the politics of hysteria as its motive forces. The old Soviet ideology had spoken powerfully to the "have-nots" of the world; the new ideology sought, in addition, to play on both the highest hopes and the most worrisome concerns of the "haves."

But the dramatically improved image that the embrace of the conciliatory principles of "new thinking" won for the USSR on the international scene came at a fatally high price. By mid 1990, the grand strategy of the "new thinkers" stood in disarray after the communist regimes in Eastern Europe had collapsed and a supposedly "renewed" Soviet Communist Party had failed to gain the sympathies of citizens voting for the first time in free elections in the USSR. Following this fiasco, traditional communist hard-liners regained their ascendancy in the Soviet hierarchy from the fall of 1990 to the spring of 1991. Allied with Gorbachev, they tried to turn the clock back and reimpose old totalitarian methods. Crude, anti-American disinformation made a partial resurgence as the conciliatory slogans of "new thinking" disappeared from the Soviet political scene.

In the spring of 1991, Gorbachev turned back to the policy of "new thinking." The hard-liners then made a last-ditch, abortive attempt to seize power in August 1991, apparently hoping that Gorbachev would join them, as he had one year earlier.

Following the collapse of the August coup and the subsequent disintegration of the USSR, various groups and states contending for power in the Commonwealth of Independent States continue to use active measures and disinformation techniques in their efforts to achieve their political aims. The formidable Soviet active measures and disinformation apparatus, which manipulated world opinion for decades, has disintegrated. The integrity of its system has been shattered, and many formerly hidden pieces now lie revealed for examination. But many large fragments of the Soviet active measures

apparatus continue to exist and function, for the most part now under Russian rather than Soviet sponsorship.

The Soviet Communist Party created what was, in all likelihood, the most formidable political influence machine in the modern world. Although the Soviets had the disadvantage of "selling" an enormously unpopular "product," they evolved a great deal of manipulative and deceptive techniques to try to compensate for this disadvantage. A close examination of how they sought to influence foreign publics and governments by orchestrating and spreading carefully selected information, disinformation, and a variety of crude, sophisticated, derogatory, conciliatory, and alarmist arguments and slogans contains important lessons for the future in understanding how other totalitarian and extremist regimes conduct active measures, and how some groups and states within the Commonwealth of Independent States continue to try to achieve political influence using these methods.

Communist countries such as Cuba and North Korea have their own active measures and disinformation apparatuses. States or groups that have been trained by the Soviets, such as Iraq and the Palestine Liberation organization use these techniques in their foreign policy endeavors. Highly ideological, anti-Western regimes such as Iran and Libya have elaborated their own front group structures and actively spread anti-Western disinformation. Various communist parties around the world continue to use these techniques. According to the April 21, 1992 *New York Times*, a recent Chinese government document speaks of the need for "prudent and active measures ... so that bilateral [U.S. -Chinese) relations develop in a way that will help us."

Finally, this report tries to make it clear that manipulative actions by foreign governments do not have to be overtly anti-American in order to be inimical to U.S. interests. Conciliatory and alarmist themes can be very damaging to the United States, if they cause the U.S. government to take actions that work to its detriment and which it would not otherwise have taken if it had not been the target of distorted or false messages systematically propagated by a foreign government for a political, economic, military or related purpose.

Given the fact that a number of states continue to engage in manipulative active measures campaigns directed at the United States, the United States Information Agency (USIA) continues to monitor, analyze, and counter foreign efforts in this area. USIA continues to flexibly reallocate its resources devoted to this mission in order to meet shifting demands. As long as states and groups interested in manipulating world opinion, limiting U.S. government actions, or generating opposition to U.S. policies and interests continue to use these techniques, there will be a need for the United States Information Agency to systematically monitor, analyze, and counter them.

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The Soviet union, or rather the totalitarian communist system that once kept 300 million people in harness and toyed with the maniacal idea of a world revolution, has ceased to exist.

Commentator Yuri Solton  
Radio Moscow  
December 30, 1991

We are leaving behind a totalitarian regime, the most powerful totalitarian regime in the world, which had relied not only on political tools, exploiting the monopoly position of one party, which was the nucleus of its power, but also on totalitarian domination of state property. You realize what a monster it was!

Mikhail Gorbachev  
address at the Sorbonne, Paris  
April 22, 1992

Another group of documents make a terrible impression. They're to do with the creators of the new thinking: When you read what they were writing in the papers on one hand, and what kind of secret instructions they were handing on, for example, how to spread propaganda against the Americans, in all types of international dealings, financing of, among others, various terrorist organizations even though we had diplomatic relations with the states in question. These dual standards were obviously an attempt to achieve the impossible.

Rudolf Pikhoya  
Russian official in charge of  
Soviet Communist Party archives  
June 5, 1992

### ***The Role of Active Measures in Soviet Foreign Policy***

The collapse of the Soviet communist power structure is leading to many revelations about how it functioned, although only the first few tantalizing fragments have so far emerged. one of the more interesting areas is that of active measures, the Soviet term for carefully crafted influence operations, which the Soviets used, in addition to traditional Western-style diplomatic and informational activities, to try to achieve the goals of Soviet foreign policy.

The importance of active measures in the Soviet approach to international relations derived from the totalitarian nature of the Soviet political system. In the USSR, the ruling party elite controlled not only the governmental structure and the economy but also all other formal manifestations of society, including the Russian Orthodox Church, the media, professional associations, academic institutions, trade unions, youth groups, peace groups, and so on. Indeed, control by a single party of virtually all the organized entities of society is the fundamental defining feature of totalitarianism.

The Soviet leaders naturally sought to use all the state and non-state entities at their disposal in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. The ruling elite of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was not content merely to exercise its power internationally through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Trade, and other state bodies. It also exerted its influence internationally through its control of the international activities of the Soviet media, professional organizations, trade unions, youth groups, academic institutions, the Russian Orthodox Church, peace groups, and virtually all other nongovernmental institutions. The Soviet Communist Party also had extensive ties with Soviet-aligned communist parties worldwide, both those that had achieved totalitarian control in their countries and those that as yet only aspired to such a goal.

In the Soviet analysis of international affairs, the various strands of international relations were divided into three categories: party-to-party, state-to-state, and people-to-people relations, a hierarchy in which party-to-party relations signified the highest degree of cooperation and understanding. While in pluralistic, free societies, state-to-state diplomacy is normally considered to be the most important aspect of international relations, in the Soviet mind, state-to-state diplomacy was only one of the ways in which Soviet influence could be brought to bear, and often not the most significant way. As then-Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze reminded his audience in July 1988, at a speech at a special "Scientific and Practical Conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs," published in the October 1988 issue of *International Affairs* (p. 19):

The country's foreign policy is not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone. All its practical achievements of recent years are the fruit of well-coordinated actions by several foreign-policy departments functioning under the guidance of the party.

Active measures were conducted in the party-to-party, people-to-people, and state-to-people realms of the USSR's foreign policy. They represented, in essence, the non-diplomatic component of Soviet foreign policy. The CPSU ruling elite conducted state-to-state affairs in the sense that the West understands it through the Soviet governmental structure, but only as one component of Soviet foreign policy. The party-to-party, people-to-people, and state-to-people aspects were equally, if not more important. It was often very difficult for Westerners to comprehend this fundamentally different Soviet approach to international relations and, as a result, the centrality to the Soviets of active measures operations was gravely underappreciated in the West.

Another important aspect of the Soviet totalitarian approach to foreign affairs is that Soviet goals in the international arena were much more ambitious and open-ended than the goals pursued by pluralistic societies, in which the beliefs in limited government and the sovereignty of the individual led to a foreign policy aimed at achieving more limited goals.

In contrast to this vision of limited national interests and corresponding respect for the interests of other countries, the CPSU's totalitarian control within the Soviet Union was naturally accompanied by a vision of similar goals internationally. Thus, a standard pre-Gorbachev textbook on Soviet foreign policy, *Soviet Foreign Policy: Objectives and Principles*, described "the main objective and supreme principle of Soviet foreign policy" as follows:

on the day it made its appearance the Soviet state inscribed the word "Peace" on its banner and made the struggle for peace the objective and highest principle of its foreign policy. When the new communist social system has triumphed worldwide and a classless society established, peace, the dream of the greatest minds throughout the ages, will be the natural situation. (p. 155)

The textbook concluded, "Peace can only be guaranteed through the ultimate triumph of communism worldwide."

Although such straightforward statements of ultimate Soviet aims were muted during the Gorbachev era, high-ranking Soviet officials reiterated them on occasion. For example, in 1989, the following statement by Lenin was cited approvingly in a book issued by the Novosti Press Agency:

The Communists must exert every effort to direct the working-class movement and social development in general along the straightest and shortest road to the victory of Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat on a world scale. That is an incontestable truth. (pp. 49-50)

The book, *The Problem of Compromise in Politics as Seen by Lenin in the First Post-Revolutionary Years (1918-1921)* was authored by Alexander Lebedev, who was then deputy head of the Ideology Department of the CPSU Central Committee, in charge of international information. Lebedev has privately denied authorship of the book, despite the fact that it appeared under his name. This raises the intriguing possibility that elements within the Soviet apparatus may have been powerful enough to have a book issued under false premises and translated into English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and Khmer behind the back of one of the most important officials of the Central Committee. Whether Lebedev actually wrote the book or whether it was issued without his approval, it represents the views of senior Soviet officials - either Lebedev or those so powerful that they could cavalierly appropriate his name.

A third aspect of Soviet totalitarian politics that set the tone for the Soviet approach to international affairs is that the CPSU ruling elite sought to achieve its goals both domestically and internationally by any and all means at its disposal, including the use of lies, deception, terrorism, and aggressive force. The CPSU ruling elite used these methods extensively at home to keep the population of the USSR under control. They also used such methods in international relations. For example, on May 25, 1992, Sergei Shakhrai, who had recently resigned as the senior legal adviser to Russian president Boris Yeltsin, made public the contents of a document that revealed direct Soviet sponsorship of terrorism against Americans during the height of the 1970s detente. According to the May 26, 1992 *The New York Times*:

Mr. Shakhrai cited a "top secret" directive dated May 16, 1975, which reported that "a shipment of foreign arms and ammunition was delivered by the KGB to the head of external operations of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine on May 14, 1975."

... The weapons were to be used, Mr. Shakhrai said, citing from the document in his hand, "to carry out operations against American and Israeli personnel in third countries, to carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism"

Mr. Shakhrai said that "thousands" of such documents had been found in a special file at the CPSU Central Committee. On June 5, 1992, Russian Information Minister Mikhail Poltoranin told a news conference that such support for international terrorism had continued through 1991. Such an ethic made the use of manipulation, deception, and disinformation standard techniques of Soviet foreign policy as well.

The Soviet totalitarian approach to international relations in terms of the entities utilized, the goals pursued, and the means employed gave Soviet foreign affairs a fundamentally different cast and thrust than the approach taken by pluralistic Western nation-states, which had much more modest goals attuned to limited national interests, and which chose not to employ techniques such as military aggression, terrorism, or the unscrupulous use of lies and other deceptive and manipulative techniques.



In short, the Soviet approach to international relations can perhaps best be described as a form of "political warfare," with the manipulative and deceptive techniques of active measures playing an essential and important role.

### ***A Typology of Active Measures Themes and Messages***

One particular type of Soviet active measures operation has received disproportionate public attention: crude, anti-American disinformation, such as the Soviet campaign that falsely claimed that the United States had created the AIDS virus in a military laboratory.


In fact, such crude, defamatory disinformation represented only the tip of the Soviet active measures iceberg. The outrageous and distasteful nature of these claims made them instantly identifiable to many audiences worldwide as attempts by the Soviets to manipulate public opinion. But there were many other types of Soviet active measures operations of equal or greater importance that were only dimly perceived or passed completely unnoticed. These less well known types of active measures operations were the ones that were, in fact, the most important during the "post-Cold War" era.

The Soviets spread a wide variety of information, arguments, and slogans in their efforts to influence foreign publics and governments. The Soviets referred to the information they spread for the purpose of influencing foreign audiences as "directed information." If the "directed information" was false or had been fundamentally distorted, it was disinformation. But accurate information was circulated as well - if the Soviets thought it would serve their interests.

It appears that the Soviets chose arguments and designed slogans with similar criteria in mind. They apparently selected them on the basis of whether the Soviets thought the slogans and arguments would induce their target audiences to take actions in line with Soviet interests. Thus, the Soviets eagerly propagated arguments and slogans regardless of whether they were genuinely believed or disingenuous.

The information, disinformation, slogans, and arguments spread by the Soviets can be further differentiated on the basis of whether they were sophisticated or crude, and whether they contained derogatory, conciliatory, or alarmist themes and messages. For example, one Soviet active measures message might consist of a disingenuous, sophisticated, alarmist argument. Another could be a genuine, crude, derogatory genuine slogan. A third could consist of sophisticated, conciliatory disinformation.

This framework yields 36 theoretically possible types of active measures messages, as illustrated by the accompanying chart. The use of conciliatory and alarmist slogans and arguments was particularly important to the Soviets in the "post-Cold War" era.



*How Soviet Active Measures  
Themes Were Spread*

The Soviets spread the various active measures themes and messages through a wide variety of covert, semi-covert, and overt channels that they controlled or influenced.

#### "Black" or Covert Active Measures

"Black" or covert active measures operations were coordinated by Service A of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, the part of the KGB responsible for foreign intelligence operations. According to KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky, in his book *Instructions From the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations 1975-1985*, in the mid-1980s Service A consisted of approximately 120 professional officers, including 30 to 40 who were stationed at the Novosti Press Agency. (p. 3) Its technical staff included a highly competent group of forgers.

According to recent defectors, KGB active measures received increased attention and resources during the Gorbachev era. Their information indicates that the size and importance of Service A expanded during the late 1980s and early 1990s.

KGB active measures techniques included the use of agents of influence, forgeries, covert media placements, and controlled media to covertly introduce carefully crafted arguments, information, disinformation, and slogans into the discourse in government, media, religious, business, economic, and public arenas in targeted countries. These operations were characterized as "black" because the Soviet role was totally concealed. These KGB operations were carried out by members of line PR (political intelligence) in Soviet residencies, the KGB units in Soviet embassies in foreign countries. According to Gordievsky, line PR officers were supposed to spend about 25 percent of their time on active measures operations.

The July 22, 1991 issue of the German magazine *Der Spiegel* revealed that the 60-man active measures unit of the East German Ministry of State Security (MfS or "Stasi"), which was patterned on Service A and which worked closely with it, had at least 7 separate sectors, one of which was responsible for economic active measures and another for active measures against foreign intelligence services. In addition to these functional sectors, Service A would logically have also had, at a minimum, a functional section on military affairs, and geographical sectors devoted to the United States, Western Europe, and the Third World, as well as a separate section for preparing forgeries.

For more information on recent revelations on "black" active measures, see the [appendix](#).

#### "Gray" or Semi-Covert Active Measures

"Gray" active measures operations were coordinated by the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. It orchestrated foreign influence operations in the party-to-party and people-to-people realms, which were carried out by Soviet-allied communist parties, Soviet-controlled international front organizations, and Soviet nongovernmental organizations that played a role in foreign affairs, particularly friendship societies, the foreign policy-related institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and the Soviet affiliates of the international front groups. These operations were characterized as "gray" because Soviet control was partially concealed. For example, Soviet nongovernmental organizations could not deny their Soviet affiliation but they claimed, disingenuously, to be pursuing an independent line from the Soviet government and Communist Party.

Recent investigations by the Russian supreme Soviet of CPSU funding of foreign communist parties have uncovered documentary evidence that during the 1980s the CPSU provided approximately \$20 million per year in direct monetary aid to 98 different parties and movements on all continents. See the [appendix](#) for more details.

### "White" or Overt Active Measures

"White" or overt active measures were coordinated by the international information subdepartment of the Ideology Department (prior to October 1988, Propaganda Department) of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. This subdepartment oversaw the propagation of Soviet active measures themes and messages by the TASS and Novosti press agencies, Radio Moscow and Radio Peace and Progress, other elements of the Soviet press, and the information departments of Soviet embassies overseas.

From 1978 to 1986, the bureaucratic entity that became the Ideology Department's international information subdepartment was known as the International Information Department (IID) and had the status of a separate department in the CPSU Central Committee (CC). In a revealing aside, although it was known to the world as the International Information Department, this was a cover name, adopted only for dealing with outsiders. Within the Soviet bureaucratic world and in confidential correspondence, the department was known as the CPSU CC Department of Counterpropaganda. It arrogated to itself the most sensitive and complex foreign propaganda tasks, such as devising explanations for the mistakes or failings of Soviet foreign policy, and dealt with the most critical foreign policy issues, such as arms control and relations with the United States, leaving to a separate CPSU CC Propaganda Department the less challenging task of churning out routine praise for the Soviet Union.

The IID was divided into 6 sectors organized around geographical and functional lines. Each sector employed about half a dozen professionals, who determined the themes, arguments, and information used in Soviet foreign propaganda and the treatment of international affairs in the Soviet press. After these were decided upon, the IID and its successors would hold regular meetings to issue their guidance on international information issues to Novosti, TASS, Radio Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress, and other leading Soviet media.


It is also revealing to note that in the "white" realm, Soviet officials took an active and direct role in spreading many active measures themes in their public and, undoubtedly, private messages directed at Western audiences. Mikhail Butkov, a KGB officer who defected in Norway in May 1991, revealed this in an interview in the December 15, 1991 issue of the British newspaper *The Independent*, stating: "In his appeals to the West, Gorbachev used all the arguments that we were ordered to plant." Thus, the Soviet active measures apparatus had a vast array of covert, semi-covert, and overt channels available for influencing foreign public opinion and actions in a highly sophisticated way. The [appendix](#) contains more details about "white" active measures operations.

The Soviet active measures apparatus dwarfed, by a factor of perhaps 20 or 30 to 1, the U.S. governmental apparatus set up to analyze and counter its activities. Given these limitations, it is only possible to provide an overall conceptual framework and some illustrative examples of Soviet active measures operations, not a comprehensive report on their activities. The typology of active measures themes and messages outlined above provides a conceptual framework for categorizing these themes. By combining the various types of active measures themes with the various "black," "gray," and "white" channels through which they were spread, one can construct a matrix that portrays the different types

of Soviet active measures operations. In the accompanying chart, the different types of themes or messages form the headings for the columns, and the various black, gray, and white channels for propagating these messages form the headings for the rows. Although such a schema is cumbersome, it is a useful way to conceptualize active measures operations in a coherent, comprehensive way.

# A Typology of Active Measures

## Themes, Messages & Techniques



## ***An Attempt To Be More Sophisticated: Disinformation On Military Spending***

In the November 1991 issue of the USSR's *Military Historical Journal*, then-chief of the Soviet general staff Vladimir Lobov referred to Soviet military spending as one-third of the Soviet gross national product [GNP]. During the same month, in issue no. 44 of *Moscow News*, Soviet President Gorbachev placed Soviet military spending at the same level, stating, "If this (the Soviet military-industrial complex) is not half of society, then it's at least a third of it." Just two months earlier, the U.S. government had estimated Soviet military spending at half this figure, 15 to 17 percent of GNP, in the publication *Military Forces in Transition*.

In comparison, the United States spent 13 percent of its GNP on defense at the height of the Korean War, 9 percent at the peak of the Vietnam War, 6 to 7 percent during the military buildup of the 1980s, and 42 percent during the maximum World War II mobilization during 1943 and 1944. The Soviet figure of one-third of GNP spent on defense during peacetime is truly staggering. As Soviet Academician Oleg Bogomolov stated in *Moscow News*, number 20 of 1990: "For decades we lived ... in conditions of a wartime economy."

Some estimates of Soviet military spending are even higher. In the March 26, 1992 issue of *Izvestia*, Russian presidential adviser Anatoly Rakitov stated:

Over the last six decades, 80 to 90 percent of our national resources - raw material, technical, financial, and intellectual - have been used to create the military-industrial complex. Essentially, the military-industrial complex has absorbed everything that is good and dynamic that Russia has to offer, including its basic economic capacity and its best technology, materials, and specialists. Consequently, the military-industrial complex is virtually synonymous with our economy.

The May 21, 1992 issue of the *Washington Post* reported Senator Bill Bradley's comment, after a recent trip to Russia and Ukraine, that, "In St. Petersburg, 70 percent of the people have jobs directly tied to the military. ... Nationwide, it's over 50 percent of the people."

For decades, Soviet leaders sought to deceive the world about the monumental extent of their military spending with a conciliatory disinformation campaign. Prior to Gorbachev, the disinformation was crude and simplistic. Until 1989, the Soviets claimed that they spent only a tiny amount on defense, which hardly varied from year to year. They presented only a single total figure for defense spending, with no further elaboration or breakdown.

Then, in May 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev stated that the Soviet Union would spend 77 billion rubles on defense that year, a dramatic increase from the prior official figure of 20 billion rubles in 1988. The 77 billion figure represented some 9 percent of Soviet GNP, which was more accurate than the earlier absurd claim that the Soviets had been spending only 2 to 3 percent of their GNP on defense, but still not an honest figure.

In an April 1990 speech, Gorbachev revised this figure upward, stating that Soviet military spending was 18 percent of Soviet national income, or approximately 15 percent of gross national product. Awkwardly, the official Soviet figure for military spending remained 77 billion rubles for 1989, with no real effort made to explain the discrepancy between Gorbachev's speech and the official government position. In October 1990, in a triumph of thoroughness over logic, the Soviet government released a detailed breakdown of Soviet military spending, completely ignoring Gorbachev's figure and adamantly

sticking to its official position on total military spending. Commenting on this, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky proudly stated: "Glasnost is reaching out into that once closed sphere, the military budget."

Gorbachev's unexplained revelation in his April 1990 speech undercut this attempt to concoct more credible, sophisticated disinformation on this issue. soon, even higher unofficial estimates began to appear in the Soviet press, capped by Lobov's and Gorbachev's statements in November 1991 that the real figure for military spending was one-third of GNP, if not higher.

As mentioned earlier, U.S. estimates of Soviet military spending were off by approximately 100 percent, even as late as 1991. The USSR was able to successfully hide from the world the fact that their "supermilitarized economy," as Gorbachev put it in *Moscow News*, was placing unsustainable strains on the Soviet economy and citizens, a situation which eventually led the Soviet leaders to adopt the policy of perestroika.

Inaccurate Western estimates about the burden of military spending on the Soviet economy were not caused by Soviet disinformation efforts but by Soviet secrecy and the inability of most Western analysts to comprehend the emphasis the Soviets placed on military strength. Pre-Gorbachev disinformation was crude and ineffective, and the more detailed and credible deceptions of the era of glasnost were overtaken by the collapse of the Soviet system. But the "post-Cold War" era did witness fabrications that were of a much higher quality than prior deceptive efforts.

### ***The Use of Alarmist Arguments***

One of the most important but difficult-to-discern aspects of Soviet active measures was the use of seemingly logical arguments. A number of these were formulated for virtually every significant foreign policy issue of concern to the USSR. These arguments were then spread via all the methods available to the Soviet authorities - overt media channels, agents of influence, front groups, covert media placements, diplomatic channels, nongovernmental organizations, and so on.

Many of these arguments were quite appealing and logical-sounding, and they often played on genuine concerns, fears, and perceptions. For example, a September 19, 1991 *Kuranty* article on the functioning of the KGB Service A officers posted to Novosti Press Agency, excerpted at length in the [appendix](#), highlighted several arguments used by Soviet active specialists. It pointed out:

What is important is that these objectivist materials pushed the same ideas directed at Western politicians and ordinary folks: to boycott the Soviet market means to prolong unemployment; American grain sent to the starving people of Africa is poisoned by pesticides; the Soviets really do not have a superiority in tanks and missiles, the Americans are just about to strike a deal with the Russians behind Western Europe's back, ... and so on.

Similarly, Soviet defector Oleg Gordievsky has pointed out, in a January 5, 1992 article in the Danish newspaper *Ekstra Bladet* (excerpted at length in the [appendix](#)), that the Soviets gave an alleged agent of influence in Denmark, Jorgen Dragsdahl, "facts and arguments" to use in his columns.

During 1990 and 1991, as the disintegration of the USSR became an ever more real prospect, Soviet active measures specialists began to craft alarmist arguments that sought to prey on these fears, for the purpose of convincing Western publics and governments to support the continued existence of the USSR as a unitary state. To support this line of thought, arguments were crafted that sought to convince



observers that the disintegration of the Soviet Union would pose grave hazards for the world. Given the natural fear of the unknown, this line of argumentation found a ready audience in many countries.

### "15 Nuclear Republics"

In this regard, one of the most successful Soviet active measures campaigns of the "post-Cold War" era sought to stimulate fears in the West that the disintegration of the USSR would lead to the establishment of 15 nuclear states, with unpredictable and, it was intimated, quite possibly extremely dire consequences for the entire world.

There is evidence that the Soviet authorities may not have been as concerned about this issue as they claimed to be. For example, in the December 8, 1990 issue of *Rabochaya Tribuna*, Gorbachev's military adviser Marshall Akhromeyev stated that "Under no circumstances will centralized control over nuclear weapons and ammunition, including strategic, or over the control systems for these weapons be lost."

At the same time, numerous Soviet spokesmen were systematically stimulating fears of "15 nuclear states" in communications aimed at foreigners. By stoking these fears, Soviet propagandists sought to exploit understandable Western concerns about nuclear safety in order to try to achieve their own policy goal of preserving the USSR as a unitary state.

Mikhail Butkov, a KGB major who defected in Norway in May 1991, told the British newspaper *The Independent* (December 15, 1991) that these scare tactics were used covertly by the KGB at the same time that Soviet leaders pushed them publicly. *The Independent* summarized Butkov's remarks as follows:

Other active measures involved spreading the idea in the West that Gorbachev's disappearance and the breakup of the Soviet Union would lead to the creation of a number of aggressive republics with uncontrolled access to nuclear weapons. Mr. Butkov observes: "In his appeals to the West, Gorbachev used all the arguments that we were ordered to plant."

The "15 nuclear states" theme was spread systematically by the Soviets starting in 1990, and became especially prominent after the abortive August 1991 coup attempt. In the wake of the failed coup, two prominent Soviets of widely varying reputations - Col. Viktor Alksnis, known for his extremely hard-line views, and Yevgeni Velikhov, the erudite scientist and Gorbachev adviser who was viewed as much more 'Liberal' - both warned of this alleged danger in interviews on Cable News Network (CNN) on August 28. Velikhov floated a sophisticated version of this argument, calling for the international community to become more involved in examining the issue of the control of the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal, while Alksnis' arguments sought to fan hysteria more directly, warning against independence for the republics by claiming they would soon be dropping nuclear bombs on each other.

Similarly, in July 1991, shortly before he joined in the plot to overthrow Gorbachev, then-Soviet Vice President Gennadi Yanayev lectured U.S. journalists, according to the recollections of one of those present, that "it would be a nightmare if the Soviet union turned into 15 states, each with its own armed forces and nuclear weapons." (Washington Post, August 19, 1991) Sergei Rogov, then deputy director of the USSR's Institute on the United States and Canada, made this same argument to U.S. journalists and policymakers in October and November 1991. An interview with Rogov in the Washington Post (October 29, 1991) reported his arguments:

... it is also in the interest of the West to support [Gorbachev's] efforts to maintain some union structure as the Soviet Union's republics spin away, said Sergei Rogov, an arms-control expert in Moscow.

That interest is most compelling when it comes to Gorbachev's efforts to maintain control over the Soviet arsenal of 27,000 nuclear warheads, which are dispersed across several republics. "A civil war in a nuclear superpower is not in the interest of anyone in the world," Rogov said.

Two weeks later, Rogov and a fellow academician from the USA Institute, Andrei Kokoshin, traveled to Washington to deliver the same theme in person to U.S. senators. The *Washington Post* of December 1, 1991 reported:

The ... two told a small meeting ... that in a "worst case scenario," which they said was not implausible, nuclear weapons could become the focus of struggles for power among the Soviet republics. This was a very volatile, dangerous situation, the senators were told: "America has to wake up."

Despite their seemingly independent and widely varying views, the hard-liner Alksnis, the soon-to-be coup plotter Yanayev, the scientific adviser Velikhov, the academicians Rogov and Kokoshin, and KGB Major Butkov in Denmark each pushed the same active measures theme in their own respective ways to Western audiences. Each was acting as a part of the Soviet active measures and disinformation apparatus, run ultimately by Gorbachev, which orchestrated messages through varying channels in order to influence foreign opinions and policies.

In a related ploy in the waning days of the Soviet Union, the Soviets sought to stimulate fears about catastrophic accidents involving nuclear weapons that might occur if Soviet central authority lapsed. In late December 1991, a high-ranking Ukrainian official, Yevgeni Marchuk, told the *Washington Post* (December 25, 1991) that these fears were vastly overblown and that he believed they had been deliberately exaggerated by Soviet authorities as part of an active measures campaign.

The *Post* reported:

Marchuk, chairman of Ukraine's new National Security Service, said he is barely troubled by the nightmare scenario of a lost or stolen nuclear warhead that has dominated Western anxieties about the breakup of the Soviet Union.

"With me knowing all the security precautions, this is a fantastic ... [and] entirely implausible" scenario, he said during a lengthy interview....

He said Western anxieties about a nuclear-equipped artillery shell being lost in transit, a tactical rocket being stolen from a truck or a nuclear bomb exploding by accident are greatly exaggerated.

"These rumors were circulated deliberately by the center ..." he said, suggesting that officials in Moscow tried to create alarm as a means of bolstering support for the former Soviet Union.

## Ethnic Conflicts

In a similar way, Soviet officials had earlier warned Westerners that support for nations seeking to secede from the USSR, such as the Baltic states, could lead to an explosion of ethnic grievances in Western Europe and elsewhere. Such arguments played on well-known Western concerns, and may have seemed plausible to the casual observer. But it is unlikely that they were made out of altruistic concern about the possibility of civil strife in the West. It is more likely that such arguments were formulated and spread in order to achieve the purposes of Soviet foreign policy.

## The Russian Winter

A perennial, although seasonal, alarmist theme spread by the Soviet active measures apparatus was "How are we going to make it through the coming winter? Every year, as the weather turned cold, the impending arrival of the Russian winter was used by Soviet active measures specialists as a vehicle for stimulating fears that catastrophic events might occur in the USSR during the long, cold winter months if more Western aid were not forthcoming, or some other concession made to Soviet preferences. Despite its crudity and simplicity, or perhaps because of these characteristics, the "Russian winter" theme was probably one of the more effective Soviet alarmist themes. It struck a responsive chord within people worldwide and at a basic level seemed intuitively obvious and correct. In addition to its simplicity, it was also a very low cost manipulative tool. After all, anyone could master the use of such a simple theme without any special training, and it no extensive research was needed to formulate the theme.

## The Break-down of the "Command Administrative" System

Another argument frequently put forward during the "post-Cold War" era sought to explain the food shortages that were then affecting some Soviet cities by putting forth the very reasonable sounding proposition that this had been caused by the fact that the old "command-administrative" economic system had been destroyed, but the new market-oriented system of distribution had not yet had a chance to take hold. In his book *Eyewitness*, the prominent Soviet journalist Vladimir Pozner stated that he believed this theme was propagated by hard-line Soviet officials in order to mask what he believed was their deliberate economic sabotage of the popularly elected mayors of Moscow and Leningrad (Gavril Popov and Anatoly Sobchak):

Soon after Popov and Sobchak were elected to office in 1989, both Moscow and Leningrad began to suffer badly from a lack of food. Dairy products, meat, vegetables, even bread were not reaching the stores. The explanation for this - or at least the one usually trotted out when journalists made inquiries - was that the old mechanism had been destroyed, while no new one had been set up to replace it. That sounded plausible enough, but it was not the truth or, at least, certainly not the whole truth.

What was really going on was economic warfare. The Moscow and the Leningrad oblasts (administrative areas) were under control of their respective Party secretaries who, in turn, controlled the many regional secretaries of each oblast. ... I have very good reason to believe that the food shortages in Moscow and Leningrad (as well as in Volgograd and Sverdlovsk, where democrats swept the old guard out of office) had very little to do with the breakdown of the old system or the absence of a new one. They had to do with a calculated effort on the Party's part to starve out the democrats, to artificially make the food situation even worse than it was by slowing down deliveries, decreasing production and creating other such nuisances. (pp. 178-179)

In this way, a very plausible and perhaps partially true argument was used to divert attention away from the machinations of hard-line CPSU officials to try to discredit their democratic opposition. This argument was widely repeated in foreign media analyses of Soviet economic difficulties.

***Internal Front Groups:  
Vladimir Zhirinovsky and  
The "Centrist Bloc"***

One of the most striking initiatives of the CPSU under Gorbachev was its willingness to permit a multiparty system in the USSR, a move that quickly led to the demise of the CPSU when Soviet citizens were able to choose among alternative parties. This is not the outcome the Soviet leaders presumably wished, however. They stated on numerous occasions that they wanted the CPSU to be invigorated by competition with democratic groups, but it is doubtful that they wanted it to be challenged to the extent that it lost its power.

In the attempt to maintain CPSU control while still allowing the trappings of a democratic system, the CPSU used active measures techniques to form bogus parties that were themselves front groups for the CPSU. It then attempted to make a show of "sharing power" with these bogus parties, using them as its supposedly "democratic partners" in a ploy aimed at denying power to the authentically democratic parties that were genuinely popular with the Soviet electorate. The so-called Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) headed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the so-called "Centrist Bloc" of parties that united under its leadership were key elements in this ultimately unsuccessful strategy of deception and manipulation.

In February 1990, the CPSU took a major step toward multiparty politics, when it decided that it would relinquish its constitutional monopoly in power, an event that formally transpired in March. A few weeks after this, the founding congress of the Liberal Democratic Party was held, an event that was announced on the front pages of all major Soviet newspapers on April 1, 1990, in marked contrast to the scant media attention that had accompanied the prior foundings of other parties.

The chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party was Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who, in contrast to the leaders of the other parties, was a political unknown. A journalist familiar with his background termed Zhirinovsky's appearance on the political scene "an April Fools' joke." He wrote in the July 17, 1990 issue of *Komsomolets Uzbekistana*:

It seems that somebody was desperate to show - following the relevant decisions of the CPSU CC and the USSR Supreme Soviet - how fast political pluralism has developed in the Soviet Union. At the same time, they do not want to advertize the real competitors of the CPSU. Therefore, the bubble of the Liberal Democratic Party was inflated.

In June 1990, the LDP and 20 other small parties joined together to form a coalition called the "Centrist Bloc." Radio Liberty research analyst Julia Wishnevsky's description of this development, in the November 23, 1990 issue of *Radio Liberty's Report on the USSR*, shows that it included several of the manipulative techniques characteristic of Soviet front group operations:

With one exception, all the other parties involved were completely unknown to the public. Since, however, some of them bore names suspiciously similar to those of established parties, this ploy was bound to confuse the unwary. Two parties - one called the Democratic Party, and the other the Russian Democratic Party - joined the Centrist Bloc, but neither had any connection with the Democratic Party of Russia led by Travkin and Kasparov (a genuine party).

In a further indication that this was an active measures operation, the founding of the Centrist Bloc was announced at a session of the Soviet Peace Committee, one of the major internal Soviet front groups.

The Centrist Bloc included parties with impressive sounding, seemingly liberal names such as the Andrei Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces, the Peace Party, the Conservative Party, the People's Constitutional Party, the Russian Popular Front, and the League of Independent Scientists of the USSR. These inspiring names often disguised unsavory characters, however.

For example, according to issue number 45 of *Moscow News* in 1990, the head of the Andrei Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces, Vladimir Voronin, was hardly a liberal. He had written a dissertation on "U.S. Psychological War" and had been arrested in 1976 for misappropriating state funds. Andrei Sakharov's widow, Yelena Bonner, denounced the use of her husband's name by this group.

Ominously, one of the member organizations of the Centrist Bloc was Soyuz, the hard-line group of People's Deputies in the USSR Supreme Soviet founded by reactionaries Viktor Alksnis and Nikolai Petrushenko, who were active in late 1990 in spreading disinformation about an alleged CIA plot to dismember the USSR by setting up a so-called Black Sea-Baltic Sea confederation. The inclusion of Soyuz in the Centrist Bloc was an indication of its true nature.

In October 1990, Zhirinovsky made the revealing statement that he considered the CPSU to be the Liberal Democratic Party's best ally. Shortly after, some LDP members accused Zhirinovsky of being a KGB agent and tried to expel him from the party but failed. In this regard, *Moscow News*, issue number 45 of 1990, reported:

It is maintained that while a student of the Law Department at Moscow University, Zhirinovsky faced an inquiry into currency speculation. He was exonerated when he agreed to work for the KGB.

After being carefully groomed and politically positioned as supposed "liberals" and "centrists," the LDP and the Centrist Bloc suddenly moved from the periphery to the center stage of Soviet political life in late 1990. On October 29, 1990, the leaders of the Centrist Bloc met with then-Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov to discuss the formation of a "coalition government of national accord" with the CPSU. This was absolutely unprecedented. The CPSU had not shared any power with other parties since the earliest days following the 1917 revolution. Now, it appeared to be taking a revolutionary step toward sharing power.

Shrewd observers of the Soviet political scene were quick to see through the ploy, however. *Moscow News* analyst Len Karpinsky, in his article "Coalition or Collusion?" in issue number 45 of 1990, characterized this event as the CPSU's attempt to mount a "political coup." He stated:

Have you heard the news? At a confidential meeting between the government and an obscure group of unofficials, the possibility of forming a coalition government on a multiparty basis was discussed.

What is it? Another farce or a serious event concealing its purposes behind a farcical mask?

... a so-called Centrist bloc has been singled out from the entire gamut of democratic parties and movements to make it responsible for all democrats.

A coalition government set up democratically could promise headway. A coalition arranged behind the closed doors of the former cabinet head's office, even with the assistance of extras from the democratic public, can promise nothing but political coup.

Instead of preparing to genuinely share power, the CPSU was only going through the motions of this process, choosing as its coalition partner not a genuine democratic party but a front group set up by the CPSU and KGB. If this ploy had worked, the CPSU could have claimed to have relinquished its monopoly

on power in the USSR and to be ruling as part of a coalition formed with supposedly democratic elements. It was an audacious scheme.

By this time, in late 1990, the hard-liners had the political momentum in the USSR, in alliance with Gorbachev, and events began to move very quickly. The supposedly independent but, in reality, covertly controlled Centrist Bloc was assigned a key role in this sequence of events as a "cut out." It floated proposals that the CPSU wished to put forward, so the CPSU could then respond positively, as scripted, to these supposedly ".democratic initiatives."

For example, in late November 1990, the spokesmen for two Centrist Bloc parties called for the imposition of presidential rule in the USSR and asked "the armed forces, the KGB, and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] to take control of all critical points" in the country. Zhirinovsky proposed that "from January 1, 1991, the activities of all political parties and organizations be halted, and the rights of nations to self-government, which was proclaimed in 1917, be repudiated."

On December 5, 1990, the Centrist Bloc announced that it was setting up a National Salvation Committee. It called for the imposition of a state of emergency in the USSR, a ban on all parties and movements, and for local Soviet authorities to be replaced by branches of the National Salvation Committee. These suggestions foreshadowed the steps that were taken by CPSU hard-liners in their abortive coup attempt eight months later. The Centrist Bloc also demanded that the parliaments of Russia, Georgia, Lithuania, and Moldova be disbanded.

TASS reported that "the program surprised journalists and even some members of the Bloc, who were already disagreeing with some provisions during the press conference."

The Centrist Bloc's call for the formation of a "National Salvation Committee" and a state of emergency appears to have been part of a carefully orchestrated sequence of events. At this same time, the liberal head of the MVD, Vadim Bakatin, was forced to resign and was replaced by Boris Pugo, who later emerged as one of the eight members of the hard-line August 1991 attempted coup. On December 11, six days after the Centrist Bloc's call for a state of emergency, KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov addressed the nation on Moscow television, noting that he was "speaking on the instructions of the USSR president." Kryuchkov gave an extremely hard-line speech, in which he claimed that "foreign special services," "organized crime," "dealers of the shadow economy," and unnamed forces that he claimed were "whipping up ... national chauvinism" and "provoking ... mass disturbances and violence" were joining together to "ultimately undermine our society and our state and to liquidate Soviet power." "The threat of the collapse of the Soviet Union has emerged," Kryuchkov warned, and "a keen struggle has developed" around "the issue of power." The KGB chairman vowed to defend the Soviet order against all internal and external attacks and called on "all honest citizens" to aid it in unmasking such threats. Kryuchkov's speech was a throwback to the rhetoric of the days of Stalin. A few days later, on December 20, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze resigned, warning that dictatorship was approaching.

Several weeks later, in January 1991, in line with the stated wishes of the Centrist Bloc, "National Salvation Committees" were formed in Lithuania and Latvia and moved to take power. These allegedly spontaneous actions by supposedly independent, ad-hoc organizations won immediate support from the Soviet central authorities. Special KGB, MVD, and Ministry of Defense forces seized facilities from the local authorities, killing 18 innocent people and wounding almost 600 in the process.

In late January 1991, the CPSU role in orchestrating events in the Baltics was revealed when the newspaper *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* published an August 29, 1990 secret resolution of the CPSU CC Secretariat on the subject of Lithuania. It called for communists in high positions in law enforcement organs in Lithuania to organize criminal and administrative prosecution of "leaders of ... nationalistic and anti-Soviet political formations" in Lithuania. In order to aid in this, a KGB military group was assigned to work with the pro-Moscow faction of the Lithuanian communist party.

For reasons that are unclear, the plan to stop the democratic process in the Baltics and institute dictatorial power in the name of phony "National Salvation Committees" never came to fruition. Colonel Viktor Alksnis, known as the "black colonel" for his reactionary views, later claimed that Gorbachev had approved the orchestrated "National Salvation Committee" coups in the Baltics but failed to follow through because he lost his nerve. By April 1991, Gorbachev was again making common cause with liberal communists such as Alexander Yakovlev. The Centrist Bloc itself stopped functioning at the end of March 1991, according to an April 21, 1991 broadcast of Radio Rossiya. It apparently no longer served the CPSU's purposes. Zhirinovsky then ran for president of the Russian federation in June, and stunned observers by finishing third after Yeltsin and former Prime Minister Ryzhkov, with 6 million votes - 8 percent of the votes cast. A key plank in his electoral platform was his pledge that, if elected, he would sell vodka "at every corner, around the clock, and without any interruptions." Radio Liberty's *Report on the USSR* of January 24, 1992 cited unconfirmed reports that KGB employees had been instructed to vote for Zhirinovsky.

In July 1991, Zhirinovsky told Novosti that he was forming a "third force" centered around the LDP to challenge Gorbachev in the 1992 elections for the USSR presidency. He also stated, intriguingly in light of subsequent events, that at the beginning of August 1991 a new powerful movement, combining the LDP, Soyuz, and similar organizations, would be founded and joined by millions of people. Zhirinovsky stated that the new movement would distance itself from communists and even more from democrats.

In August, of course, communist hard-liners tried to seize power in the name of the State Committee for the State of Emergency. Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party was the only political party to publicly support the coup, and it was subsequently banned by Yeltsin for this action. Despite this setback, Zhirinovsky brazenly continued to call for the imposition of emergency measures, the establishment of a new State Committee for the State of Emergency, the closure of all newspapers, and the disbanding of all political parties.

In December 1991, as the USSR was collapsing, the phony nature of Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party was officially confirmed. On December 25, Alexander Kichikhin, an expert from the Russian parliamentary commission investigating the August coup, stated that the LDP had no local branches, as it had claimed, and that, in fact, its membership did not exceed 500 to 600 people. Kichikhin stated that the list of 5,300 signatures appealing for the LDP's registration had been forged. He also stated, according to the TASS account:

the CPSU actively supported and financed the LDP. Special Purpose Militia Detachment subunits guarded the LDP leader on his trips. Links have been established between Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the former USSR KGB leader Vladimir Kryuchkov. According to Kichikhin, when Zhirinovsky would arrive in a town he would first meet with KGB staffers and make use of their services. This makes it possible to conclude, Alexander Kichikhin said, that the LDP is not an autonomous political party, "but sort of a wing of the CPSU."

Thus, multiparty democracy as the Soviet leaders envisaged it was to have the KGB create bogus front groups that could pose as noncommunists, enabling the CPSU leaders to join with them in a phony coalition government, while excluding genuine democratic parties. This elaborate scheme failed miserably, however, when Gorbachev apparently withdrew his support for it after the bloodshed in the Baltics in January 1991.

After the failed August coup and the collapse of the USSR, Zhirinovsky continued to posture and plot on the Russian political scene. His extreme nationalistic rhetoric grew increasingly shrill. On December 30, 1991, the Washington Post reported his speech before a Moscow crowd:

Zhirinovsky went on and on for hours, claiming that when he finally gained power he would invade Afghanistan and make it a Russian "province." He would sell off western Ukraine to Poland and take the rest for Russia. He would fill the universe with "space weapons" pointed at the United States.

"I'll bury radioactive waste along the Lithuanian border and blow the stuff across the border at night," he said. "They'll get radiation sickness and die of it. When they either die or get down on their knees, then I'll stop it. I'm a dictator. What I am going to do is bad, but it is good for Russia!"

In March 1992, Zhirinovsky told Armenia's Armenpress "we must immediately begin a siege on Georgia and Armenia, strangle every moving thing there, impose Moscow's rule, and sign a treaty with Turkey declaring that region as a passageway for Russia."

In December 1991, Zhirinovsky joined Viktor Alksnis, Alexander Nevzorov, and other hard-liners to form a group called "Ours." The group took its name from a television program of the same name made by Nevzorov in January 1991, in which he made the outrageous disinformation claim that the people who had been killed by Soviet forces in the assault on the television tower in Lithuania were actually victims of heart attacks and traffic accidents. This new organization will presumably do its best to push its views by all means possible on the Russian political scene.

(For more information and analysis on Zhirinovsky, the Liberal Democratic Party, and the Centrist Bloc, see these excellent articles, from which much of the preceding material was drawn: "Multiparty System, Soviet Style" by Julia Wishnevsky in the November 23, 1990 issue of *Report on the USSR*, "The Leadership of the Centrist Bloc," by John Dunlop in the February 8, 1991 issue of *Report on the USSR*, and "Is Russia Likely to Turn to Authoritarian Rule?" by Vera Tolz and Elizabeth Teague in the January 24, 1992 issue of *Report on the USSR*.)

### ***The Conciliatory Slogans Of New Political Thinking***

Although there were many interesting developments in the post-Cold War era as Soviet disinformation and active measures became more conciliatory, alarmist, and focused on domestic political rivals, the most far-reaching and intriguing event, indeed, in many ways, the defining mark of the post-Cold War era, was the development of "new political thinking." Under "new political thinking," the Soviets sought to replace confrontation with cooperation, great power politics with reliance on the United Nations, and the arms race with disarmament. This was a mind-boggling turnabout of historic proportions.

The architects of "new thinking" have stated that their new policy was adopted under duress in the mid-1980s when it became unmistakably clear to the most farsighted Soviet thinkers that their decades-long Cold War policies of trying to extend Soviet power through a massive military buildup, coercive



diplomacy, and confrontation had failed. The Soviet leaders knew that the Soviet economy would have collapsed if they had tried to respond militarily to the U.S. defense buildup and particularly the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). As Sergei Rogov of the USSR's Institute on the United States and Canada explained in his 1989 monograph *Is a New Model of Soviet-American Relations Possible?*:

The endeavor [SDI], as conceived, seemed to be without risk: if the USSR were to respond to the U.S. challenge, the Soviet economy would collapse in trying to compete with the stronger economic, scientific and technological potential of the United States and its allies; and if, on the other hand, the USSR did not follow suit, the United States would gain an overwhelming military superiority. (p. 24)

In this dire situation, a fundamentally new, non-military method of seeking to achieve Soviet goals had to be found. "New thinking" was the bold, creative, ingenious, and, ultimately, disastrous result.

The Soviet rationale for adopting the policy of "new thinking" was amply explained in numerous Soviet publications from 1987 to 1989. The basic concepts were very simple:

- military might is no longer the main method of achieving power in the modern world; instead skill at devising political campaigns is much more important. As Shevardnadze put it in his 1991 book *The Future Belongs to Freedom*, the Soviet "new thinkers" believed in "the primacy of the force of politics over the politics of force." (p. 50)
- the growing interconnectedness of the world and the growing concern about global problems would mean that, in waging political campaigns for hearts and minds worldwide, "common human values" and "all-human" concerns would have much more appeal than the outmoded ideology of communism.

In the minds of the Soviet "new thinkers," ending the Cold War did not mean that the systemic struggle between the "two social systems" would stop. Instead, it would shift from the Cold War arenas of the arms race, confrontation, and coercive diplomacy to new, primarily political areas of struggle. The Soviets needed to end the Cold War because their weak economy put them at an impossible disadvantage vis-a-vis an awakened West in an arms race which, if it continued, would mean their inevitable defeat. In order to avoid this and best preserve their power, the Soviet leaders needed to induce the West to abandon the arms race, while at the same time positioning themselves to wage a new form of political warfare against the West: one that sought to achieve power by conciliation rather than confrontation, the appeal of "all-human" values as opposed to "class" values, assigned a key role to the manipulation of international organizations, particularly the United Nations, and sought to use international law as a subterfuge for Soviet attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries rather than the heavy hand of military power and coercive diplomacy.

As part of the shift to "new thinking," the Soviets did the unthinkable. They deliberately jettisoned the outmoded ideology of communism and embraced a new ideology based on "all-human" values and concerns. They did not do this because they had become converts to the democratic cause. Instead, the Soviet "new thinkers" came to the conclusion that governments, countries, and peoples could be more effectively manipulated by universalist, non-Marxist concepts than by Marxist ones, and set about trying to devise ways to use non-Marxist concepts to achieve traditional Soviet goals. "New thinking" was consciously designed as a communist foreign policy for the post-communist era. It was as if the "chameleons," not the "doves," had triumphed over the "hawks" in the Soviet foreign policy debate.

"New thinking" was conceived by the boldest, most creative and cosmopolitan communist propagandists and ideologists. It was adopted in desperation, as the reality of looming Soviet defeat in

the Cold War became unavoidably clear. Nevertheless, it was not a defeatist policy. Its goal was to devise a technique that would eventually enable a restructured USSR to establish preeminence globally.

The Thinking Behind "New Thinking":

The Ineffectiveness of Force in Achieving Soviet Goals

The Soviets adopted "new thinking" in the mid 1980s when it became clear to them that their policy of force in the international arena, which ultimately relied on the threat posed by Soviet nuclear missiles, was not succeeding because of the resistance of the United States, NATO, and other countries to Soviet expansionism and hegemony.

In his 1987 book *Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World*, Mikhail Gorbachev stated bluntly that the "fundamental principle of the new political outlook is very simple: nuclear war cannot be a means of achieving political, economic, ideological or other goals." (p. 140) Gorbachev explained, "Nuclear war is senseless; it is irrational. There would be neither winners nor losers in a global nuclear conflict: world civilization would inevitably perish." (p. 141)

Although such observations may seem to be belaboring the obvious to Westerners, the idea that a nuclear war could not be fought and won was, as Gorbachev put it, a "truly revolutionary" conclusion for Soviet leaders. (*Perestroika*, p. 140) Senior Gorbachev adviser Vadim Zagladin reiterated this point in his 1989 book *To Restructure and Humanize International Relations*, stating unambiguously that, "Even comparatively recently, we believed it was possible to survive and even win a nuclear war." (p. 68) Zagladin explained that, under "new thinking," "the first change in our foreign-policy doctrine is the total rejection of the idea of a nuclear war and affirmation of the absolute necessity to prevent it." (p. 68)

It is shocking to realize that until the mid 1980s Soviet policy accepted the idea that it was possible to fight and win a nuclear war. Yet that was precisely the case. This explains the reason for the enormous, decades-long Soviet military buildup, which was consuming approximately one-third of Soviet gross national product by the late 1980s.

In addition to discarding the policy option of nuclear war, the Soviet "new thinkers" also discarded other, less apocalyptic variants of their policy of force. As Gorbachev observed in *Perestroika*:

Military technology has developed to such an extent that even a non-nuclear war [between major powers] would now be comparable with a nuclear war in its destructive effect.

...Thereby, an altogether different situation has emerged. A way of thinking and a way of acting, based on the use of force in world politics, have formed over centuries, even millennia. ...Today, they have lost all reasonable grounds.

...A new dialectic of strength and security follows from the impossibility of a military - that is, nuclear - solution to international differences. Security can no longer be assured by military means.... Attempts to achieve military superiority are preposterous. ...The only way to security is through political decisions and disarmament.

...For the first time in history, basing international politics on moral and ethical norms that are common to all humankind, as well as humanizing interstate relations, has become a vital requirement. (p. 141)

Serious reservations about the utility of force in the modern world had been brewing in the Soviet leadership for several years prior to the advent of "new thinking," according to former Soviet Foreign

Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. In his book *The Future Belongs to Freedom*, Shevardnadze stated that as early as 1980 the Soviets recognized that military force had not been effective in Afghanistan and, in light of this, were extremely reluctant to use force in Poland. Shevardnadze wrote:

Before 1979 the use of force by the Soviet union in neighboring countries had helped to stabilize the situation at a relatively low (as it seemed at the time) political, military, and economic cost. This quick "solution" did not work in Afghanistan. The invasion of that country provoked a strong negative reaction that grew daily in our society and abroad. Whereas only a few people in the Soviet Union openly protested the sending of troops into Prague in 1968, after 1979 the majority condemned the Afghan adventure, either directly or indirectly.

In those circumstances the political leadership was compelled to take seriously the risk involved in any action on our part in Poland. Many had come to realize that the armored fist could not strike. Here is an example: On one of those days I happened to be in Mikhail Suslov's office. Someone phoned him to report about the worsening situation in Poland and to insist, as I understood it, on an "activation of forces." Suslov repeated firmly several times, "There is no way that we are going to use force in Poland." (pp. 120-121)

In short, between 1980 and 1985, the combination of Afghan, Polish, Western, and other resistance to the Soviet use of force convinced the Soviets to dramatically de-emphasize nuclear war, conventional war with the West, the arms race, and the use of force in international relations as viable instruments of "class warfare," a breathtaking departure from previous Soviet policies. The policy of force and all that flowed from it, including the Cold War and the panoply of Soviet confrontational policies, were abandoned, not because the Soviets believed it was wrong to try to impose their will on others, but because they now believed military force was not an effective way to do so. This was an extremely radical, fundamental shift in Soviet thinking.

Something had to substitute for military force as the prime mover in international affairs. In adopting "new thinking," the Soviets attempted to make political campaigns against what Shevardnadze has called "the real enemies of humanity: thermonuclear war, environmental catastrophe, and the collapse of the world economy" the new levers with which they would try to achieve their goals. (*The Future Belongs to Freedom*, p. 48) Whereas Marxism was, in many ways, the politics of confrontation and envy, with its central paradigm the struggle of the economically oppressed versus their oppressors, "new thinking" relied much more heavily on the politics of conciliation and alarmism as its motive forces. The old Soviet ideology had spoken powerfully to the "have-nots" of the world; the new ideology sought, in addition, to play on both the highest hopes and the most worrisome concerns of the "haves." As Gorbachev stated in *Perestroika*, "For the first time in history, basing international politics on moral and ethical norms that are common to all humankind ... has become a vital requirement." (p. 141)

### ***The Conciliatory Slogans Of New Political Thinking***

#### **The Ideology of "New Thinking"**

In order to understand the logic behind the Soviet embrace of political campaigns based on all-human values and concerns, it is necessary to understand the Soviet concept of ideology, which has been explained by Evgueni Novikov, who defected from the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's International Department in 1988, in his unpublished manuscript *The Hidden Dynamics of Perestroika*.

Novikov, now a professor at the U.S. Army's Russian Institute in Germany, taught for 15 years at the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's Institute of Social Sciences, informally known as the International Lenin School, which trained thousands of Marxist revolutionaries from all over the world in the fundamentals of running a Soviet-style system. (In October 1991, the Lenin school was transformed into the Institute for Sociopolitical Research, under the same leadership as before. In early 1992, its facilities were taken over by the Gorbachev Foundation.)

According to Novikov, the Soviets view ideologies as pseudo-scientific constructs based on carefully selected portions of social theories, which the party elite uses in order to achieve its goals. Novikov states, "it should be stressed that an ideology is not a theory, but the party elite's self-interest translated into theoretical terms." Thus, Novikov notes, despite the fact that Marxist ideology prevailed in the Soviet Union, certain books by Marx were forbidden. They were part of Marxist theory, but conflicted with Marxist ideology - that portion of the theory that served Soviet interests. So, they could not be read.

"New thinking" was a mind-boggling innovation: a totally new, supra-Marxist Soviet ideology. Instead of relying solely on Marxist theory, the "new thinkers" used all of human thought as "raw material" for constructing a new Soviet ideology, including cherished Western concepts about human rights, democracy, and freedom of choice, as well as universal human concerns about the dangers of nuclear war and irreparable damage to the environment. The idea animating the "new thinkers" was to construct an ideology that would be more effective than communist ideology in enabling Soviet leaders to design manipulative propaganda campaigns that could be turned to Soviet advantage. As Yuri Krasin, then head of the CPSU Central Committee's Institute of Social Sciences, told a group of fellow Marxists in 1988:

concern was voiced here that the raising of the issue of universal human values implied a rejection of the class-based approach. I am convinced this is not so: the Communists are assessing and analyzing these values from Marxist positions. ...Do we really need to talk to people using political terminology only? After all, there are simple words clear to everyone, such as life, freedom, or justice. They reflect concepts which we interpret from our own Marxist perspective. (World Marxist Review, March 1988, p. 116)

The principles developed in the mid-1980s by the "new thinkers," which they viewed from their own "Marxist perspective," had enormous worldwide appeal. They included such concepts as the Common European Home, the primacy of universal human values, a non-offensive military doctrine, reasonable sufficiency in military armament, defense conversion, the demilitarization of international relations, a non-nuclear world, disarmament for development, ecological security, the democratization of international relations, the rule of law, a new international order, a new security system in Europe, a heightened role for the United Nations and other multilateral institutions, collective security, the settlement of regional conflicts, a balance of interests among states, the de-ideologization of state-to-state relations, eliminating the "enemy image" and moving to the notion of "partnership," worldwide cooperation in the fight against terrorism and drugs, integrating the Soviet economy into the world economy, humanizing international relations, non-violence, the inadmissibility of using force or the threat of force to attain political objectives, respect for the principle of freedom of choice, respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of other countries, and a comprehensive and all-embracing system of international security.

It would be hard to find a more appealing and hopeful set of principles for guiding international relations. But it is important to remember that these principles were embraced by the Soviets not for

their intrinsic value as Westerners understand them, but in order to achieve traditional Soviet goals by conciliatory rather than confrontational, and political rather than military means. The Soviets have spoken quite openly about this. As senior Gorbachev adviser and prominent "new thinker" Vadim Zagladin stated in his 1989 book *To Restructure and Humanize International Relations*: "our course towards peace, towards peaceful coexistence and competition between the two systems does not at all imply abandonment of our revolutionary goals." (p. 87)

Sergei Rogov summed up Soviet thinking on this issue in *Is a New Model of Soviet-American Relations Possible?*. He stated:

...the need for a new political thinking has arisen. Such thinking does not mean the denial of class interests in the international arena. . -However, in the present-day conditions, the sphere of their action is limited. The nuclear stalemate has made it impossible to 'win' the competition between socialism and capitalism through the use of force. ...For the first time in the history of the class struggle, violence can no longer play a 'midwife' role in the birth of progress.

The competition between socialism and capitalism, which is determined by class interests, cannot be resolved militarily, but must now be channelled along peaceful lines, in the economic, political, and ideological spheres. This means that the earlier widespread belief that the historical formations will change in a relatively short period of time is out of date. ...The two socio-economic formations are therefore bound to coexist and interact for a long time to come (for several generations). This implies cooperation in the solution of global problems. (p. 31)

In other words, in developing "new thinking," the Soviets hoped to devise a methodology that would enable them to "win the competition between socialism and capitalism" peacefully, in several generations, without recourse to arms or the arms race. This was to be achieved in large part by using the enormously appealing slogans of "new thinking" as the rallying cries for political propaganda campaigns designed to secure Soviet interests.

How did the Soviets believe that this might work in practice? A cryptic statement by then-Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin in the September 27, 1991 issue of *Izvestia* provided a clue.

In the *Izvestia* article, Pankin stated that one of the three main priorities guiding Soviet foreign policy at that time was the "primacy of international law over national law." This intriguing principle could have been combined with the "new thinking" maxim of the "democratization of international relations" to devise a peaceful method for seeking to augment Soviet power that would have been fully consistent with "rule-of-law" principles. For example, the Soviets could have urged that majority-rule procedures (the "democratization" of international relations) be adopted at the United Nations for passing measures binding on U.N. member states (a "rule-of-law" world). This could have resulted in a system that could theoretically have been used by the Soviets to interfere in the internal affairs of Western countries (the primacy of international law over national law), if they had been able to devise anti-Western measures that would have been appealing to a majority of U.N. members.

In his speech at Fulton, Missouri on May 6, 1992, former Soviet president Gorbachev made a number of radical proposals-that are consistent with this interpretation of the thrust of "new thinking." He proposed the establishment of a global government, a broad expansion of the U.N. Security Council, greater powers for the United Nations, and the further "democratization of international relations," without explaining what he meant by this phrase. Gorbachev stated:

The principle according to which certain states or groups of states could monopolize the international arena is no longer valid. What is emerging is a more complex global structure of international relations. An awareness of the need for some kind of global government is gaining ground, one in which all members of the world community would take part.

...Here the decisive role may and must be played by the United Nations. Of course, it must be restructured, together with its component bodies, in order to be capable of confronting the new tasks.

...Nothing, for instance, other than the division into victors and vanquished, explains why such countries as Germany and Japan do not figure among the permanent members of the Security Council.

...The great country of India should be represented in the Security Council. The authority and potential of the Council would also be enhanced by incorporation on a permanent basis of Italy, Indonesia, Canada, Poland, Brazil, Mexico, and Egypt, even if they do not initially possess the veto.

...Under certain circumstances it will be desirable to put certain national armed forces at the disposal of the security council, making them subordinate to the United Nations military command.

Gorbachev's suggestions went beyond a radical restructuring of the Security Council and a significant expansion of U.N. military powers. He also hinted at potentially more far-reaching changes, stating that "On today's agenda is not just a union of democratic states, but also a democratically organized world community-" At another point, he urged, "A major international effort will be needed to render irreversible the shift in favor of a democratic world - and democratic for the whole of humanity, not just for half of it."

Gorbachev's proposal that the number of permanent members of the U.N. Security Council be tripled, from five to fifteen, by adding Germany, Japan, India, Italy, Indonesia, Canada, Poland, Brazil, Mexico, and Egypt, was a bold political gesture, although its ultimate results, if it were implemented, are unclear. If such an expansion were to take place, it would certainly make the security council a much more cumbersome and complicated body, and could easily blunt its ability to act quickly, decisively, and effectively. In addition, if these ten additional countries were added to the Security Council, large and populous countries such as Pakistan, Argentina, Ukraine, Nigeria, and Iran, as well as a host of others, might be tempted to put forward their own bids for membership as well. Thus, while it is difficult to foresee how such a proposal could lead to greater efficiency and effectiveness on the part of the United Nations, it is easy to see how it could lead to a great deal of squabbling and infighting, with the lion's share of the stirred-up resentment directed at the current permanent members of the Security Council. If Gorbachev had made such a proposal while he was still serving as Soviet leader, then the USSR could then have posed as the champion of the rights of "countries without a voice" and worked to direct the subsequent anger at the United States, Great Britain, France, and China, much in line with the traditional objectives of Soviet foreign policy.

During the "post-Cold War" era, Soviet officials repeatedly endorsed the call for a strengthened United Nations, in line with Gorbachev's 1992 suggestions. In an interesting development of this theme, an article "Foreigners in Parliament" in issue number 31 of *New Times* in 1989 made the novel suggestion that "an international treaty be concluded according to which the signatories would exchange representatives to sit in parliaments." It expressed the hope that "with time, international chambers (ICs) will be formed within these parliaments with special rights and duties." It then opined:

It would be useful if parliaments and their International Chambers delegated some of their powers relating to the interests of the world community of nations to an integral international body. The most

rational way to do this would seem to be to use the United Nations, transforming it into a World International Chamber (WIC). It could have the status of a chamber attached to the parliaments of the member countries....

... The difference between the U.N. and the WIC is obvious. The latter would consist of MPs, that is, of people who possess real legislative powers and, consequently, would have the power to resolve the internal problems of its member countries.

The article then soothingly claimed:

As for non-interference in internal affairs, this is becoming an increasingly dangerous dogma nowadays. moreover, if ICs are formed no country will lose its sovereignty since the number of foreign MPs (members of parliament) will be restricted by quotas. But, undoubtedly, taking into account the priority of universal human values, it will only be just if the WIC is given enough power to resolve the specific problems that come within its competence, including the right of veto.

Thus, in the name of "the priority of universal human values," the Soviets floated the idea of granting vast, new powers to a super-U.N., which would have placed its representatives in national legislatures, and would have had the right to veto the efforts of nations to protect themselves from its intrusions, allegedly because "non-interference in internal affairs ... is becoming an increasingly dangerous dogma nowadays." This extremely creative scheme for implementing the principle of "the primacy of international law over national law" was shocking in its cavalier disregard for principles, such as non-interference in internal affairs and national sovereignty, that have formed the cornerstone of international affairs for centuries.

Several months later, in a lengthy article entitled "Ecology and Diplomacy" in the November 22, 1989 issue of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, then-Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze explicitly suggested using the U.N. as a vehicle for anti-Western actions, invoking the notion of "ecological security" as a stalking horse for such initiatives. In the article, Shevardnadze suggested drawing up a binding international "code of civilized and ecologically correct behavior of states" that would include the following draconian provisions: "no activity on the part of any state - either economic or military - should harm the environment both within and beyond its national jurisdiction" and "any forms of economic and other activity whose ecological consequences are unpredictable are impermissible." He called for decisions on this matter to be made by the U.N. Security Council, because it is "the only organ in the U.N. system authorized to make decisions that are mandatory for all states." If adopted, such a scheme would have afforded tremendous opportunities for anti-Western mischief making.

Shevardnadze went on to state:

Western corporations annually get tens of billions of dollars in profit which are literally pumped out of developing countries. ...It is necessary to reverse this trend so that at least a part of the money is returned to the developing countries, say, as ecological aid.

The contrast between "old thinking" and "new thinking" could not be clearer. In traditional communist ideology, capitalism, in the form of transnational corporations, was identified as the enemy, and Soviet-style socialism as the solution. Under the ideology of "new thinking," pollution was identified as the enemy, Western transnational corporations as the source of the problem, and binding international initiatives at the United Nations (ideally designed with substantial Soviet input) as the solution. Thus, "new thinking" provided an extremely cooperative, non-militaristic, non-confrontational, democratic, and "rule-of-law" approach to achieving unchanged Soviet goals. The collapse of the USSR interrupted

elaborate preparations by Soviet front groups and other elements of the active measures apparatus to make "ecological security" a rallying cry at the June 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Brazil.

The way in which the "new thinkers" apparently envisioned using the United Nations reflected classic Soviet methods of political maneuver that went back to the days of the Bolshevik revolution. One of the main Bolshevik slogans of 1917 was "All Power to the Soviets" (the word "soviet" in Russian means "council"). At the time, the soviets were acting as rival authorities to the Provisional Government, then Russia's governing body. By propagating this slogan, the Bolsheviks hoped to weaken the existing government, and have formal power transferred to entities that were easier to penetrate and manipulate. A more honest slogan would have been "All Power to the Bolshevik Party," but Lenin and his cohorts preferred to create the impression that they were seeking to transfer power to popular bodies, not to themselves.

The "new thinkers" appear to have had a very similar scheme in mind in proposing vast new powers for the United Nations under the guise of "democratizing" international relations. The Soviets had devoted decades to the task of placing their bureaucrats at key positions within the U.N. power structure. They may have calculated that new powers for the United Nations would, in actuality, mean increased power for the USSR. Such a scheme would have been fully consistent with the Soviet penchant for using front groups and moribund bureaucratic structures with vast potential power, such as the U.N. military command, as the instruments through which they sought to exercise power behind the scenes, in the name of various "all-human" causes.

In short, during the era of "new thinking," propaganda campaigns designed around "all-human" values and concerns, international law, and the United Nations replaced confrontation, a military buildup, and great power politics as the favored methods for making Soviet influence manifest throughout the world. As Shevardnadze stated, the "new thinkers" based their policy on "the primacy of the force of politics over the politics of force."

As mentioned earlier, the 3 main "all-human" concerns around which the political campaigns of "new thinking" were based were the dangers of nuclear war, environmental catastrophe, and the collapse of the world economy. In August 1991, Shevardnadze added another allegedly grave danger to this list: the specter of collapse of the USSR into chaos. In an interview on Soviet television on November 19, 1991, he stated, "An unstable Soviet Union is now the greatest threat to the whole world. It is, perhaps, a greater danger than nuclear, ecological, economic, and all other threats." (Washington Post, 11/20/91) The apparent objective of this politics of hysteria was to dilute and nullify the power of Western states and institutions, such as NATO, and to instead transfer power to huge, multilateral organizations that could be much more easily influenced by Soviet-abetted propaganda campaigns, and could be thoroughly penetrated by Soviet bureaucrats ostensibly working for the common good.

### ***The Conciliatory Slogans Of New Political Thinking***

Military-Related Themes:

A Non-Nuclear World, Disarmament,  
Reasonable Sufficiency, & Non-Offensive Defense



Many of the conciliatory themes of "new thinking" related to military topics because it was essential to the Soviet Union to severely curtail the military competition with the West if they could not win it, in order to deny the West an advantage in this area.

The first was the call for a non-nuclear world. This was made on January 15, 1986, when Gorbachev unveiled a plan for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide by the year 2000. The Soviets emphasized at the time that they meant this goal seriously and not as a mere propaganda ploy. Subsequent events have given added weight to these statements. As Zagladin explained in his 1989 book *To Restructure and Humanize International Relations*:

A sober consideration of the new international situation has prompted us not merely to draw isolated conclusions or to make a partial correction in our positions, but to make a major revision of many of our views, in effect, to work out new approaches to the solution of the problems facing mankind.

First, we have revised our attitude towards the prospects and consequences of a nuclear war. Even comparatively recently, we believed it was possible to survive and even win a nuclear war. ...But after thoroughly analyzing the findings of science regarding the nature and specific qualities of nuclear weapons and the possible consequences of their use, we concluded that a nuclear war was unwinnable, that its victim would be all of humanity.

...Thus the first change in our foreign-policy doctrine is the total rejection of the idea of a nuclear war and affirmation of the absolute necessity to prevent it.

Second, ...we have also revised our attitude towards the problem of safeguarding security. Formerly we believed, (as many continue to do in the West) that the optimal way to safeguard security was above all to build powerful weapons ensuring a military potential absolutely comparable to that of a possible enemy.

...[But] to count on war in the nuclear age as a means of guaranteeing the national security of any country is a gross and terribly dangerous error. No political objective can be attained with the help of modern arms.

So the essential inadmissibility of nuclear war leads to the inevitable conclusion that security can be safeguarded not by increasing the quantity and deadliness of weapons, but through disarmament until all weapons of mass destruction are eliminated.

... We believe that ensuring a stable and lasting peace requires more than eliminating the nuclear, military threat, that it also necessitates the creation of reliable guarantees against its revival.

...This presupposes reducing armaments to a level at which each country will be able to defend itself against external aggression but will be unable to perpetrate acts of aggression against any other country. (pp. 67-72)

In addition to playing to the universal human desire for a world safe from the threat of nuclear weapons, the Soviets also embraced the appealing concepts of "reasonable sufficiency" and "non-offensive defense" as principles that could be used to achieve their purpose of eliminating military power as a key determinant in the systemic contest between the USSR and the West. These concepts provided a seemingly rational, objective yardstick which appeared to take the interests of all nations into account in establishing criteria for worldwide military levels. A 1989 Novosti booklet, *Politics and*

*Power* put forth the following criteria for setting military force levels, demonstrating the Soviet penchant for establishing principles that apply not only to their country but also to others:

Every state has its own criteria of how much military strength it needs. It depends on the country's population, economic condition, technological development, territory, the length of its land and sea borders, as well as some historical factors, traditions, etc. All this provides a basis for a reasonable policy designed to meet adequate defense and security requirements.

In addition, there are always a number of variables, depending on change in policy, the state of international relations, the nature and intentions of military and political alliances, the correlation of strength, and so on.

All these factors determine how much strength is needed.... It is obvious, for instance, that given all this the Soviet Union should have more strength than any West European country or Japan. But such superiority in itself is no call for any fears on anyone's part. (pp. 24-25)

The Soviets sought to use the appealing slogans of "non-offensive defense" and the call for a new military doctrine as ways to try to influence decision-making on military affairs in the West. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev admitted this during his press conference with President Bush at the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet summit in Malta in December 1989. At that time, Gorbachev stated, "...when we move toward defensive doctrines - that is, we, the Soviet Union - we are interested in having new elements in the military doctrines of the NATO countries." (*Washington Post*, 12/4/89)

The Soviets made the push for CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) seminars on military doctrine an important factor in their foreign policy, hoping to use these forums to influence decision making in Western countries. Interestingly, at the second Vienna conference on military doctrines in October 1991, Colonel General Omelichev suggested "a consolidation of military might under U.N. auspices," in line with another key precept of "new thinking." As noted at more length in the [appendix](#), an alleged KGB agent in Denmark, Jorgen Dragsdahl, paid special attention to thinking by Western intellectuals on the issue of "non-offensive defense," and, according to the April 17, 1989 issue of *The Nation*, the former Soviet ambassador in Denmark "took a keen interest in the theories and channeled them back to Moscow."

### Eliminating the "Enemy Image"

One of the main themes of "new political thinking" was that the United States should "eliminate the image of the Soviet Union as the enemy" and, as Gorbachev stated in June 1989, "mov[e] from the notion of enemy to the notion of partner." (*Washington Post*, June 22, 1989) This theme encouraged the thought that the rivalry between the U.S. and the USSR was not an inevitable clash between competing and irreconcilable visions of freedom and totalitarianism, but rather the result of mistaken images which had arisen from hostile propaganda, and could therefore easily be "eliminated."

The Soviet purpose in propagating this theme was made clear in late 1987 by Georgi Arbatov, the head of the Soviet Academy of Science's Institute on the United States and Canada, who wrote in a letter to the editor published in the December 8, 1987 issue of the *New York Times* that:

...We have a "secret weapon" that will work almost regardless of the American response - we would deprive America of The Enemy. And how would you justify without it the military expenditures that bleed the American economy white, a policy that draws America into dangerous adventures overseas

and drives wedges between the United States and its allies, not to mention the loss of American influence on neutral countries? Wouldn't such a policy in the absence of The Enemy put America in the position of an outcast in the international community?

While the Soviets were urging the West to discard its image of the Soviets as an "enemy," they were duplicitously providing support to anti-Western terrorist organizations. On June 5, 1992, Russian Information Minister Mikhail Poltoranin told a news conference, according to the *Washington Post* (June 6, 1992), that:

documents would soon be released showing that the authors of "new political thinking" - a sarcastic reference to Gorbachev - practiced a "double standard" in foreign policy. He said the documents showed that the Kremlin continued to have contacts with terrorist and other subversive groups well into the Gorbachev era.

"The latest date on these documents is 1991. Assistance mainly took the form of money, weapons, special supplies," said Poltoranin. ... "Weapons were delivered by warships to be handed over somewhere in the Atlantic. Sometimes sacks or whatever were loaded on rafts. Some time later, another ship would come by and pick the load up."

The *Post* article noted:

Recent assertions by Russian officials that the Soviet Union channeled funds and arms to "terrorist groups" have dismayed the Kremlin's traditional allies in the Third World. At today's press conference, an Arab journalist asked Poltoranin if he was not confusing "terrorist organizations" with "national liberation movements" that Moscow openly supported.

"When we speak about assistance to terrorist activities, we mean supplies to terrorist groups that filed requests with the Central Committee, declaring their readiness, for example, to blow up oil pipelines or kill American businessmen," said Poltoranin. "They were supplied with rifles, guns, hand grenades, submachine guns, and so on. This is terrorism and this had the support of the party leadership."

#### The "De-ideologization of State-to-State Relations"

The "de-ideologization of state-to-state relations" was one of the main conciliatory slogans of "new political thinking." To Western minds, it conjured up the image of relations between the Soviet Union and other countries becoming more pragmatic, less driven by doctrinaire, ideological concerns. For the "new thinkers," there were additional subtleties.

Two Soviet placements in the Nigerian press in 1989 illustrate how this concept was understood by the Soviets. One, entitled "Respecting rules of international behavior," appeared in the March 29, 1989 issue of the *Tide*, authored anonymously by "A correspondent." It made it clear that, in the Soviet mind, the "de-ideologization of state-to-state relations" affected only one sphere of international affairs and did not mean the end of Soviet support for "national liberation movements." It stated:

De-ideologization is one of the basic principles of new thinking, advanced by the Soviet leadership.

Does this mean that Moscow is abandoning the policy of support for national liberation movements, as some people claim? Not all. When we speak about the de-ideologization of relations between states we should remember that they are only a part of the total package of international relations, which includes

a broad range of contacts and ties between nongovernmental, mass, professional, party, humanitarian, and other organizations.

When we deal with parties, movements, and trends, we proceed from class interests.

...In general, the era of national liberation revolutions is over.

...The exceptions are in the Middle East and South West Africa.

In the April 26, 1989 issue of the *Tide*, the article "Ideology and World Peace" by Georgi Mirsky made explicit the critical difference in Soviet ideology between "inter-state" and "international" relations. The former are to be "de-ideologized;" the latter cannot be. The article stated:

...international relations is a broader term than inter-state relations, the latter being part of the former. It is clear that there can be no de-ideologization of international relations, which include, apart from inter-state relations, the relations between public and political movements, political parties, etc. It is impossible to de-ideologize all this. There will always be special ties based on ideological affinity between various elements of the international communist and working class movement, between them and the socialist countries, and between the latter and the socialist-oriented countries of the Third World. One cannot prevent people, classes, political parties or countries from sympathizing and helping the forces close or related to them.

Thus, the "de-ideologization of state-to-state relations" involved only a limited easing of tensions, in the Soviet mind. Relations between states were to be purged of ideological considerations, but not the other aspects of international relations: those involving parties, mass and professional organizations, public groups, etc.: precisely the arenas in which active measures operations were conducted.

The Soviet leaders were careful not to communicate their full understanding of the principle of the "de-ideologization of state-to-state relations" to Westerners. In dealing with Western audiences, the conciliatory slogan was put forward without explanation. Soviet leaders could be confident that virtually all in the West, not being skilled in the intricacies of Marxist dialectics, would misinterpret it. This suited Soviet purposes. But in the Third World, the Soviets needed to explain to longtime allies that this conciliatory slogan did not mean that they were being abandoned.

### The Common European Home

The slogan of the "Common European Home" was actually put forward as early as November 23, 1981 by CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in a speech in Bonn, West Germany. Mikhail Gorbachev made it a key principle of Soviet foreign policy in a major speech in Prague in April 1986. As with many of the slogans of "new thinking," the details of what the Soviets understood the "Common European Home" to mean were not explicitly stated. Nevertheless, it was an appealing, catchy slogan that quickly became an integral part of international discourse during the "post-Cold War" era.

In an article in the August 27, 1988 issue of Austria's *Volksstimme* newspaper, senior Gorbachev advisor Vadim Zagladin explained how the Soviets envisioned the "Common European Home" evolving. He stated:

Our concept of the "common European home" is an attempt to advance even further on the basis of [the CSCE] Helsinki [process]. This concept envisages the following final goals:

- In the military sphere: the establishment of firm, concrete guarantees for peace on the continent, including the elimination of the existing asymmetries in armaments, arms reduction, and the elimination of the nuclear threat.
- In politics: deepening equal and constructive cooperation and completely solving all upcoming problems at the negotiating table for the mutual benefit of all European states and peoples.
- In the economy: the establishment of a common European mechanism that permits all European countries - without violating the interests of any country or any integrated group - to draw maximum benefit from equal cooperation, both among themselves and among the economic groups on the continent.
- In culture: the establishment of a mechanism of cooperation that permits us to more deeply recognize, appreciate, and enrich our common cultural heritage.
- In the humanitarian sphere: the establishment of structures that make it possible not only to solve the developing humanitarian problems on a mutually acceptable basis, but also to guarantee real trust among the people and the working out and confirmation of a way of thinking conducive to all-European demilitarization, substituting the partner image for the enemy image even though the partner may have views different from one's own.

The Soviets sought to make the multilateral CSCE forum the concrete foundation of the "Common European Home," in the process downgrading the importance of institutions such as NATO (which, after all, operated on the premise of the maligned "enemy image"), the European Community (which did not allow equal access for all "European countries," i.e., the then-Soviet bloc), and CoCom, the Coordinating Committee of industrial countries in charge of limiting the export of militarily significant Western technology to the Soviet bloc, which violated the principle of equal cooperation for all European countries. An article in issue number 9 of *New Times* in 1990 declared that CoCom "interferes with the laying of a good foundation for the Common European Home."

The "Common European Home" slogan, by its very nature, implicitly excluded the United States and Canada. On the "state-to-state" level, the Soviets denied this, and stressed that the U.S. and Canada would be welcome to join all-European organizations. But in the non-state-to-state sphere of mass communications and perceptions, Soviet propagandists were well aware that championing the concept of the "Common European Home" would naturally tend to encourage feeling of European separateness from the United States and Canada. In this way, the traditional Soviet goal of splitting the NATO alliance was pursued by conciliatory, political means, rather than the confrontational, military methods of the Cold War.

#### A New Security System in Europe

In the June 4, 1990 issue of *Time* magazine, Gorbachev sketched out a bold new vision of a world without military alliances, such as NATO. He stated:

My own vision comes down to this: not only should military confrontation between the alliances come to an end, but alliance-based coexistence should become a thing of the past. ...Politically, we are already entering a new phase that should be characterized by the establishment of permanent security structures instead of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

By this time, of course, the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist as an instrument of Soviet policy, so Gorbachev had little to lose by proposing its dissolution. In contrast, he had much to gain by suggesting that NATO be scrapped.

As a substitute for NATO, one Soviet front group publication that the CSCE become the embryo of a new security system for Europe, rather than existing Western structures such as NATO or the West European Union. An article in the June 1990 issue of *Peace Courier*, the publication of the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council, stated, "The CSCE is the body which should develop the new security structure in Europe, while the existing military alliances should be allowed to wither away." In another variant, two Soviet generals suggested, in the October 1990 issue of *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, "a re-forming of NATO and the Warsaw Pact (while it still legally exists) from military-political blocs into a single Common European Security Alliance."

### Technology Sharing

Soviet leaders also sought to use the conciliatory techniques of "new political thinking" to gain access to Western technology, especially militarily-relevant technology. In October 1991, just before he was reappointed Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze suggested in the Soviet weekly *New Times* (issue number 40, 1991) that the United States share with the USSR the technology it had developed for the Strategic Defense Initiative, ostensibly for the purpose of improving "early warning of natural calamities" and other benign, "all-human" purposes. Shevardnadze wrote:

We are no longer adversaries. We have exchanged statements to this effect. ...Who is going to object that to the fact that the superpowers share the common interest of preventing terrorist attacks against them coming from a third party? That means that we can and must cooperate, share technologies and scientific achievements.

...SDI elements can be used for the solution of such global problems as ecological monitoring, early warning of natural calamities, and an effective navigation system.

### ***The Conciliatory Slogans Of New Political Thinking***

#### "New Thinking" in Perspective: the Soviet View

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev perhaps best summed up the core precepts of "new political thinking" in his speech before the Congress of People's Deputies on May 30, 1989. He stated:

The Congress of People's Deputies is to consider and to legislatively endorse principles of our foreign policy course for the coming years. I believe these must be as follows:

the country's security should be ensured primarily through political means, as a component of universal and equal security, in a process of demilitarization, democratization and humanization in international relations, with a reliance on the prestige and resources of the United Nations Organization;

the use of force or the threat of force to attain any political, economic or other ends are inadmissible; a respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity in relations with other countries are indispensable;

dialogue and negotiations to achieve a balance of interests, and not confrontation, should become the only means of resolving international issues and settling conflicts;

we are in favor of making the Soviet economy part of the world economy on a mutually beneficial and equitable basis and in favor of active participation in the formulation and observance of the rules of the present international division of labor, scientific and technological exchanges, trade, and cooperation with all those who are prepared for it.

In January 1990, the Soviet Foreign Ministry published its report to the Supreme Soviet on "the main lines of the foreign policy of the USSR in the years of perestroika." It explained the economic, political, military, and technological developments that led the Gorbachev team to adopt the principles of "new political thinking:"

...the world was undergoing changes unparalleled in scope and pace.

...A dynamically developing economy based on new technologies, primarily electronics and information technology, is becoming a key source of influence in the world. ...Global communications are giving rise to a single world information area. No frontiers can stop news or its interpretation from being transmitted immediately to any part of the world. ...Attempts to shut out the rest of the world are particularly ineffective today, to say nothing of their unfavorable political consequences.

...There is a mounting trend toward an interpenetration of economic mechanisms, towards integration at regional and global. The world economy is becoming a single whole as far as its main characteristics are concerned, and no country left outside it can keep abreast of the times.

...The ideas of freedom and democracy, the supremacy of law and order, and freedom of choice are increasingly taking hold in people's thinking. Individuals and peoples who are now in a position to compare things are demanding conditions and a quality of life that technological progress can provide.

By the mid-1980s, the most fundamental truth has fully come to light: those who fail to respond adequately to the challenges of this complex period of transition involving the very foundations of human being in the economic, political, humanitarian or any other sphere of material and intellectual life will find themselves in the margin of world civilization.

A change is taking place in the very concept of national security. No nation can consider itself secure unless it commands a powerful dynamic economy. Those who have put the emphasis on military means are themselves at a disadvantage. More and more, it is technological and monetary factors that are at work as sources of political influence in the world ... whereas huge arsenals that have swallowed so much effort and expenditure can provide no reasonable response to the challenges of today. These armaments are so powerful that they cannot be used without putting one's own country, one's neighbors and, indeed, the whole planet at the risk of destruction. Military means of ensuring national security are objectively giving way to political and economic ones.

Thus, by the mid-1980s, the Soviets had concluded that their extremely militarized and confrontational foreign policy, inefficient economic autarky, and technological backwardness had led them into a strategic dead-end and that a fundamentally new policy had to be devised. On November 15, 1989, Gorbachev spoke about the need for the Soviet economy to regenerate itself if it did not wish to slip "hopelessly behind" the rest of the world and suffer a "strategic defeat." He said:

In the context of general civilization, we have been left, so to speak, in a bygone technological age in a number of vitally important social spheres. The industrialized Western countries, meanwhile, have entered another age, an age of high technology and fundamentally new relationships between science and industry....

...Moreover, in the last few years, the technology gap between the USSR and the developed countries, above all in computer-based technologies, extensively employing modern achievements of science, has even widened.

The world is about to develop into a new computerized community.

We should be aware of this and realize that any delay in this area of society's development is tantamount to a strategic defeat.

And if we maintain our previous rate of development, we shall risk ending up hopelessly behind the world in scientific, technological and social progress.

In February 1987, in a meeting with leaders of the Soviet mass media and propaganda organs, Gorbachev compared the Soviet situation then with the one that had impelled Lenin and the newly-empowered Bolsheviks to accept the onerous peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany in March 1918. Gorbachev's remarks on this occasion have never been published, but one of the meeting's attendees, Yegor Yakovlev, spoke about Gorbachev's comments in the 1987 Novosti pamphlet *Openness, Democracy, Responsibility*:

Frankly speaking, it came as a surprise when Gorbachev spoke of the Brest Peace Treaty, the treaty which Lenin has described as a disgraceful, oppressive, immeasurably severe, obscene, foul and humiliating peace. What is the analogy here? The Brest Treaty exemplified how short lived interests could be sacrificed for a historic turn to secure vital interests.

Yakovlev's summation of Gorbachev's remarks and his use of the Brest-Litovsk analogy are evidence that although the Soviet leaders were extremely worried about their situation, they hoped to turn events to their advantage with a bold, conciliatory strategy.

#### The Soviet View of Compromise and Conciliation

The Soviet penchant for using conciliatory tactics and compromise as a way to seek advantage was best explained in the 1989 monograph *The Problem of Compromise in Politics as Seen by Lenin in the First Post-Revolutionary Years (1918-1921)*, authored by Alexander Lebedev, who served during 1990 as head of the international information subdepartment of the CPSU CC Ideology Department. As noted earlier, Lebedev has privately denied authorship of this monograph. Whether it was authored by him or under his name by someone more powerful than him, it is worth noting because it reflects the thinking of senior levels of the Soviet leadership during this time. Lebedev left the CPSU Central Committee in late 1990 to become counselor at the Soviet embassy in Prague. During the August 1991 hard-line coup attempt, he and Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia Boris Pankin issued a statement condemning the coup - the only Soviet diplomats to do so. When Pankin became Soviet foreign minister, Lebedev became the Soviet, and later Russian, ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

The monograph explained the Leninist understanding of compromise as a temporary phenomenon, a "moment of agreement" that occurs when "the new ... is not yet strong enough to completely



overthrow the old." It reminded the reader that a Leninist compromise "in no way minimizes revolutionary devotion and readiness to carry on the struggle." The monograph emphasized:

Lenin repeatedly stressed that a compromise did not eliminate the struggle. Nor did a compromise make the question of "who will defeat whom" irrelevant. ... Lenin observed that a compromise was a very specific form of struggle. It is a peaceful form of struggle in which the factor of agreement and coexistence prevails over the factor of mutual exclusion. (p. 6)

In a formulation that can be viewed as a guide to the thinking behind the "post-Cold War" policies of glasnost, perestroika, and "new political thinking," the monograph stated:

...in the sphere of foreign policy the most important thing for Lenin on the question of compromise was to neutralize and, if possible, isolate the class enemy; in the realm of home policy the most important thing was the problem of winning allies, of building and expanding the mass base of the movement. It is important to note that here Lenin viewed the question of compromise as the key problem of long-term political strategy. (p. 24)

The monograph characterized the following extremely Machiavellian quotation from Lenin as "without question the key provision of all of Lenin's writings on compromise:"

The most powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skillful, and obligatory use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable, and conditional. (pp. 23-24)

The monograph concluded that "compromise is an indisputable objective law of the revolutionary process," admonishing its readers that "it is impossible to get even a general picture of these processes ... without seeing the problem of compromise as part and parcel of the question of revolution." (p. 49)

The monograph also shed light on the reasons the Soviets had for wishing to integrate the Soviet economy into the world economy and for wishing to reintroduce elements of a market economy in the USSR. It described Lenin's policies during the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s, which allowed the rebirth of some market economic relations after the harsh, confiscatory policies of "War Communism" had brought the USSR to the brink of economic collapse:

So, out of necessity, the idea emerged of turning for assistance to foreign capital, ... which, from the point of view of the class-oriented analysis of the alignment of the main forces inside the country and on the world scene, was the outright enemy of the Soviet state and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

... Lenin's provisions on this score are of great importance for understanding the way the elements of capitalism were used in the conditions of NEP. It can be said that in essence Soviet power in those days allowed and even cultivated ... precisely that (and only that) kind of capitalism and only in that form which it considered admissible and desirable. As Lenin put it, this is "capitalism which we shall be able to restrain, and the limits of which we shall be able to fix...."

... Naturally, the growth of capitalism was bound to revive anti-Bolshevik tendencies. ... But even that prospect did not bother Lenin. The attitude towards small-scale commodity producers in general was one thing, while the attitude towards their ideologists was something else. In the case of the former,

compromise was inevitable and even desirable, while in the case of the latter complete irreconcilability was necessary. ...In the latter case, it was methods of suppression that were necessary.

...But let us return to the problem of the relations with ... foreign big business, the highly advanced capitalism of Western Europe and America.

Lenin believed that the most resolute compromise had to be made with that force. For "socialism is inconceivable without large-scale capitalist engineering based on the latest discoveries of modern science. ...At the same time, socialism is inconceivable unless the proletariat is the ruler of the state. This is also ABC."

Thus, the idea was to combine that large-scale capitalist engineering and the corresponding organization of labor with the domination of the proletariat in politics. In other words, it was necessary to figure out how to combine the dictatorship of the proletariat with state capitalism in the economy.

...All that, of course, did not mean establishing a kind of "Lass peace" with the capitalists ... on an international scale. This, so to say, was the class struggle in the form of coexistence and, consequently, compromise. (pp. 42-45)

At one point, the monograph referred pointedly to Lenin's use of compromise during the Brest-Litovsk peace talks with the Germans in February 1918. It stated:

Because it had been clearly realized that the idea that the "world revolution" was just around the corner was a sheer illusion, it became necessary to put an end to the mood of revolutionary impatience, to convince the Party and government officials of the urgent need to take the only step that could save the Soviet state - to make a humiliating and difficult compromise with an outright class enemy - German imperialism.

...The key problem in February 1918 was that of compromise, specifically compromise with the class enemy. (p. 12, 14)

The monograph was, of course, not the abstract musing of an academic historian, but a rigorously argued presentation issued in the name of an authoritative senior CPSU ideologist of the principles that were to guide what was then the current "line" in Soviet policy. compromise and conciliation were key, for these were the best techniques that a weakened Soviet Union had at its disposal to try to avoid what Soviet leaders viewed as looming defeat in the Cold War and to devise a strategy that would give them hopes of eventually emerging victorious in the systemic struggle with the West. The Soviet leaders felt they had no choice but "to make a humiliating and difficult compromise with an outright class enemy," in the hopes of being able to "neutralize and, if possible, isolate [that] class enemy." In order to do this, the confrontational, militaristic policies of the past had to be discarded because they were not achieving their objectives and, in fact, were proving to be self-defeating. The Soviets believed that an aggressive policy of compromise the spiral at confrontation that was leading to their defeat, help the USSR gain access to the fruits of foreign and domestic capitalism's economic vitality, which it hoped to use to "win allies and build and expand the mass base of the movement." But while capitalists at home and abroad would be wooed, capitalism would be assaulted on the ideological front, but this time not by the bankrupt forces of socialism, but by the vibrant forces of environmentalism, anti-nuclearism, and economic envy, which the "new thinkers" hoped they could manipulate through sophisticated diplomatic and active measures campaigns. This was the "long-term political strategy" the Soviet "new thinkers" devised, centered around using compromise as an "indisputable objective law of the revolutionary process."

In his speech on "Points of Mutual Advantage: Perestroika and American Foreign Policy," Secretary of State James Baker highlighted the danger of assuming that the fact that the Soviets used conciliatory slogans meant that they interpreted them in the same way that Westerners did. He stated, with reference to the U.S.-Soviet relationship:

No relationship has been more difficult, or ultimately more promising. Difficult because traditional Soviet ideology has used the same words as we do - democracy, human rights, freedom, peace and justice - while in practice denying the values behind them.

This problem became especially vexing during the era of "new political thinking," when the Soviets evolved a coherent and comprehensive set of conciliatory political slogans and principles, which they interpreted from their own Leninist perspective, and which they sought to use as weapons in a peaceful form of struggle for eventual world domination. During the "post-Cold War" era, the conciliatory slogans of "new political thinking" were repeated ad nauseam in the speeches of Soviet leaders, in Soviet media, in Soviet press placements throughout the world, in Soviet front group publications, by Soviet agents of influence - in short, by all Soviet diplomatic, propaganda, and active measures assets. The relentless orchestration of these themes through all Soviet-controlled and -influenced channels, combined with their inherent attractiveness to Westerners, who interpreted them in a vastly different way than the Soviets meant them, guaranteed that these Soviet slogans soon began to be repeated widely in political discourse in the West. Despite this impressive ability to seize the momentum in much of the political debate in the West, however, the slogans of "new thinking" did not accomplish their purposes and ended in an unmitigated disaster for their creators, as first the communist regimes of Eastern Europe and then the USSR itself collapsed.

### ***Crude, Anti-American Disinformation***

In the "post-Cold War" era, the Soviets dramatically decreased their sponsorship of crude, anti-American disinformation, basically because the propagation of such themes decreased receptiveness, on the part of world publics and elites, to the conciliatory themes of "new political thinking," which, for the Soviets, were paramount to impress on audiences worldwide. The Soviet decision to curtail crude, anti-American disinformation was not entirely voluntary, however. The vigorous exposure of Soviet disinformation by the U.S. government, which forced the Soviets to pay a steep price in terms of their resulting tarnished image worldwide, in all probability played a decisive role in convincing the Soviets to forego many of the benefits they derived from smearing their "main opponent" with vicious lies.

Until mid-1987, by which time the conciliatory themes of "new political thinking" had become ascendant in Soviet policy, Soviet disinformation under Gorbachev had proceeded in its usual confrontational mode, seemingly guided more by the policy of "uskorenienie," or acceleration, than by that of glasnost. In fact, in late 1986 and early 1987, as the Soviets were making "glasnost" and "perestroika" key principles of their policy at home and abroad, they were simultaneously beginning or significantly accelerating a number of crude, anti-American disinformation campaigns. These included false claims that the United States had invented the AIDS virus in a military laboratory; that it had killed the 918 people who died in the mass suicide at Jonestown, Guyana in 1978; and that Americans were adopting Latin American children in order to butcher them and use their body parts in organ transplants, the so-called "baby parts" story. (For a detailed account of these campaigns, see the 1988 USIA report to Congress, *Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost*.) As a measure of the times, such outrageous claims were printed

through mid-1987 in publications such as *Moscow News*, which was soon to gain a deserved reputation as one of the flagships of glasnost.

The U.S. government had, of course, made its displeasure about these disinformation charges made known to the Soviets both publicly and privately. In response, in August 1987, Soviet officials assured the U.S. government that Soviet media would stop spreading the AIDS disinformation claim. Despite some exceptions, AIDS disinformation charges diminished drastically not only in the Soviet press but also worldwide.

This marked the beginning of what was to become a prolonged, more-or-less steady decline in crude, anti-American disinformation that lasted from August 1987 to November 1990.

Numerous derogatory Soviet disinformation operations continued to occur, of course. For example, in late July 1989, a forged letter purportedly sent in 1987 from South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker surfaced in Namibia, several months before the elections to form a government in that country. The sophistication of the forgery indicated Soviet involvement. An actual South African Foreign Ministry letterhead and a sample of Mr. Botha's real signature were apparently used to compose the forged letter, which appeared in photocopy form - all trademarks of a KGB Service A operation. The theme of supposedly close U.S. -South African cooperation was a standard Soviet theme at the time, and one that had appeared in past forgeries of Soviet origin. Finally, according to Soviet defectors, the forged letter used typical Soviet bureaucratic phraseology, and was written as if it had been composed in Russian and then translated, somewhat clumsily and literally, into English.

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[To view reproductions of the forgery, [click here](#).]

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A few days later, further developments strengthened the view that this was a well-coordinated effort with Soviet involvement. Disinformation from *Top Secret*, a magazine published in West Germany that serves as an outlet for Soviet and Cuban disinformation aimed at Africa, also appeared in the Namibian press. *Top Secret*'s editor, Michael Opperskalski, was then in Namibia on a "fact-finding" mission for the International Organization of Journalists, long identified as a Soviet-controlled international front.

But significantly, even though this disinformation operation was sophisticated and well coordinated, Soviet news agencies did not replay the allegations, as they have typically done in years past. This dramatically reduced the impact that the planted stories had beyond their local environment.

Following the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, crude, anti-American disinformation receded even further. Forgeries designed for media replay, in particular, became much less frequent, as Soviet active measures practitioners were careful not to take actions that would antagonize the United States. From late 1989 to late 1990, there was still a regular flow of individual stories in the Soviet press and abroad that falsely accused the United States of various misdeeds - assassinations, coups, and so on

- but no massive concerted campaigns. During this time, the Soviets engaged in anti-American disinformation cautiously and half-heartedly. The flamboyant disinformation stories, surrounding AIDS, "baby parts," Jonestown and similar themes, rarely appeared. The next chapter's selected chronology of crude, defamatory Soviet disinformation from January 1989 to August 1991 gives specific details on the appearance of such stories.

Then, in November 1990, as the hard-liners moved towards ascendancy in the USSR, crude, defamatory Soviet disinformation began a comeback, but with a somewhat different thrust and focus. This time, the main target was not the United States, but democratic and nationalist groups within the USSR. On November 4, 1990, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, a favored outlet for disinformation placements in the Soviet media, falsely implied that members of the liberal Interregional Group in the Soviet parliament were being supported by the CIA. The *Sovetskaya Rossiya* article was, for the most part, a reprint of a lengthy article that had appeared on September 26, 1990 in the *Guardian*, a small, radical left-wing newspaper in New York City. *Sovetskaya Rossiya* also printed an extensive chart, however, which it claimed had been published "in the American press," without specifying in which publication. This chart made it appear, falsely, that the CIA was controlling the activities of various nongovernmental organizations in the United States, one of which had supplied \$40,000 to the Interregional Group, in a perfectly legitimate, public way, to purchase computers, printers, video equipment, and facsimile machines. Thus, a vast CIA-controlled conspiracy was falsely alleged.

On November 17, 1990, one of the leaders of the hard-line Soyuz faction in the Congress of People's Deputies, Col. Viktor Alksnis, falsely charged that the CIA was manipulating both the Interregional Group and nationalist groups in the USSR, as part of a diabolical scheme to dismember the Soviet Union. Alksnis strongly implied that he had received his information from Soviet military intelligence. Speaking in the Supreme Soviet, he stated:

I, as a member of the military, have access to certain information - you know that the army has its sources of information ... reports, ciphers, and other information which, at times, are obtained at the risk of the lives of our people.

...At the end of August, in an Eastern European country, a secret meeting with the CIA station chief took place at which plans for the dismemberment of the USSR took place. Representatives from Rukh from Ukraine, the Byelorussian Popular Front, the Movement "Sajudis," the National Front of Latvia, and the National Front of Estonia were at that meeting. At the suggestion of the CIA, a plan for the creation of a Black Sea-Baltic Confederation was put forward.

This idea about the creation of a Black Sea-Baltic Sea confederation resounded the day before yesterday at a meeting of the Interregional Parliamentary Group, from the mouth of one of our respected deputies. ...I want him to know whose idea he is broadcasting.

...When I see the secret plan of the Central Intelligence Agency for the destabilization of the internal political situation in the country, I see that the plan that was worked out two years ago is being completed ahead of schedule this means that it is not simply an objective process it is controlled.

On December 11, 1990, "on the instructions of the USSR president," KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov made a speech on Soviet television, in itself an unprecedented act for a KGB chief. In his speech, Kryuchkov echoed the charges made by Alksnis and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, suggesting that "foreign special services" were seeking to dismember the USSR. He stated:

The threat of the collapse of the Soviet Union has emerged. National chauvinism is being whipped up. Mass disturbances and violence are being provoked.

...Forces operating employing far from democratic methods are rushing to seize power on a wave of anti-communism. The Committee for State Security possesses information that, in certain hot spots, lists of people are being compiled and, I quote, liable for neutralization if the need arises.

The emergence of some extremely radical political tendencies is far from spontaneous, but is single-minded and well thought through. Some of them are enjoying lavish moral and material support from abroad.

...Officials of the state security bodies see their duty as preventing any interference in our internal affairs by foreign special services and by those foreign organizations and groups which, with their support, have conducted a secret war against the Soviet state for decades and which are continuing to do so.

On December 22, 1990, Kryuchkov made another extremely hard-line speech, this time to the Congress of People's Deputies. In it, he accused the West of shipping "impure, and sometimes, infected grain, as well as products with an above-average level of radioactivity or containing harmful chemical admixtures" to the USSR. He warned again that "Western ... secret services and foreign anti-Soviet centers" were allegedly continuing to try to subvert the USSR. He charged:

Facts are clear: the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, for example, does not even consider getting rid of radio "Liberty" and foreign anti-Soviet formations which are being financed by it. By the way, within the structure of U.S. intelligence is a unit set up to collect information about the movement of workers in the USSR and, hence, to influence it single-mindedly.

Kryuchkov's "facts," in the case of Radio Liberty, were sadly out of date. It is true that the CIA did covertly fund Radio Liberty during the 1950s and 1960s, but since the early 1970s Radio Liberty has been openly funded by the U.S. Congress through the independent Board of International Broadcasting, as Kryuchkov surely knew.

A few days later, Soviet Defense Minister Yazov joined in the anti-U.S. and anti-democratic chorus, accusing the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, which aids democratic groups worldwide, of trying to influence events in the USSR.

In early January 1991, the anti-democratic campaign reached a crescendo when a 40-minute documentary film, "The Faces of Extremism," was broadcast on Soviet central television. Shots of terrorism in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Spain were mixed with film clips of U.S. military operations in Grenada, Panama, and Libya, followed by scenes of a rally held by Rukh (the democratic party in Ukraine), riots in Central Asia, fighting in Azerbaijan, and demonstrations in Lithuania. The narrator suggested that the U.S. government would soon try to organize underground political movements in Central Asia in order to cause the collapse of the Soviet Union. He solemnly warned: "The country is at a turning point. Time demands that we stop the extremist frenzy. Tomorrow could already be too late."

Nine days later, Soviet troops stormed the Vilnius television tower in Lithuania, killing 14 unarmed people. Leningrad newscaster Alexander Nevzorov claimed three days later that the deaths had occurred as a result of "traffic accidents" and "heart attacks." His broadcast showed a man with crazed eyes drinking from a flaming bowl as Nevzorov stated, "It seems the Lithuanians are prepared to drain

the bitter cup of nationalism to its dregs." Latvia's Radio Riga labeled the report "totally staged terrorist propaganda."

Similar absurd claims continued in the following months. In February 1991, Prime Minister Pavlov, later a participant in the abortive August coup attempt, accused Western banks of trying to sabotage the Soviet economy and overthrow the government.

During the coalition war against Iraq, anti-coalition disinformation stories frequently appeared in Soviet media and in foreign media used for KGB placements, despite the anti-Iraq stance adopted by Soviet diplomacy. Pravda repeated false Iraqi claims that coalition forces were attacking Iraqi mosques, schools, and hospitals. The Indian newspaper Patriot, which, according to defector testimony, had been set up with KGB funds in order to spread Soviet propaganda and disinformation, falsely claimed that the U.S. was encouraging Turkey to seize northern Iraq. In late February 1991, a forgery that may have been of Soviet origin appeared in Stuttgart, Germany. Purporting to be printed on the letterhead of the U.S. Information Service, it recounted decades of alleged U.S. military slaughters of civilians in various countries in order to explain why "our armed forces had to target a civilian air shelter in Baghdad." The forgery was referring to a recent incident in which an Iraqi military command center, not a civilian air shelter, had been bombed.

Then, at the beginning of March 1991, the international Soviet disinformation apparatus suddenly began to churn out anti-American stories in a way it had not done for several years. On February 28, an Indian Marxist newspaper repeated the false claim that the CIA was trying to set up a "Black Sea-Baltic Sea" confederation in order to dismember the USSR. On March 1, a four-part series of anti-CIA articles began to appear in the Malaysian press, repeating old Soviet disinformation charges. On March 4, a newspaper in Zimbabwe repeated many familiar AIDS disinformation claims and added a new one: the false charge that the U.S. had spread AIDS to the USSR and the Third World by exporting "AIDS-oiled condoms."

Then, just as suddenly as these defamatory disinformation stories had reappeared, they stopped. This coincided with a move toward a more conciliatory Soviet policy toward the West in April 1991.

Soon, however, crude disinformation began to reappear again. In June 1991, in a closed speech to the Supreme Soviet that was soon leaked to the press, KGB chief Kryuchkov falsely claimed that the CIA had riddled the USSR with a network of "agents of influence" and was using them to undermine Soviet society. In late July, just weeks before the attempted hard-line coup, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, long identified as a Soviet-controlled front group, circulated "baby parts" disinformation charges in Geneva, the first apparent Soviet sponsorship of this story since October 1988.

Following the failed coup attempt, this last resurgence of defamatory Soviet disinformation faded away, as the "new thinkers" returned to power for a few brief months before the USSR ceased to exist in December 1991.

### ***Crude, Anti-American Disinformation***

"Geheim" and "Top Secret" Magazines:  
Purveyors of Crude, Defamatory Disinformation

Two West German publications, *Geheim* and *Top Secret*, continued to circulate old-style, defamatory Soviet disinformation, including AIDS disinformation, throughout the entire "post-Cold War" era. Both magazines are edited by Michael Opperskalski and published in Cologne, Germany.

Opperskalski, who also heads the organization Media Pro, is the co-author of several anti-CIA books, *CIA in Mittelamerika* (Lamuv Verlag, 1983), *CIA in Westeuropa* (Lamuv Verlag, 1982), and *CIA in Iran* (Lamuv Verlag). In 1988, he coauthored the anti-CIA propaganda and disinformation book *CIA: Club der Moerder: Der U.S. Geheimdienst in der Dritten Welt*, also published by Lamuv Verlag. Opperskalski's co-author in this last book was Kunhanandan Nair, at the time the East Berlin correspondent for *Blitz*, an Indian newspaper that was identified by Soviet defector Alexander Kaznacheev in the early 1960s as having "close ties with Soviet intelligence" and which continued to carry Soviet disinformation and propaganda for decades. In the description of the authors in *CIA: Club der Moerder; Der U.S. Geheimdienst in der Dritten Welt*, Opperskalski was also listed as having worked for the Cuban news service Prensa Latina and as the West German correspondent for *Soberania*, a propaganda and disinformation magazine published by a Sandinista-affiliated Nicaraguan organization. Opperskalski also participated in the activities of the International organization of Journalists, long identified as a Soviet-controlled international front organization.

The German-language publication *Geheim* began in 1985 and has been published 2-3 times a year since then. *Top Secret*, which describes itself as the "international English-language version" of *Geheim*, has been published twice a year since 1988.

In the inaugural edition of *Top Secret*, Opperskalski explained its goals and purposes in an editorial. He wrote:

In 1985, we started to publish, in German, the magazine *Geheim*, which reports on and denounces the above mentioned (alleged CIA and U.S. government) processes of destabilization and intervention. In particular, it features "Naming Names" of CIA agents working under diplomatic cover, a method that has been forbidden in the United States by Reagan's Identities Protection Act. *Geheim* stands in the tradition of the U.S. magazines *Covert Action Information Bulletin* and *Counterspy*. *Geheim* cooperates with *Soberania*, which is published in Nicaragua.

The technique of "Naming Names" of alleged CIA agents, in which Opperskalski took such pride, was a well-known disinformation technique pioneered by Soviet bloc intelligence services. In testimony before the U.S. Congress in 1980, Ladislav Bittman, the former deputy chief of the active measures department of the Czechoslovak intelligence service from 1964 to 1966, explained this technique. He was asked if he was familiar with the book *Who's Who in the CIA* by Dr. Julius Mader, published in Berlin in 1968. The book claimed to identify 3,000 U.S. intelligence officers serving in 120 countries. Dr. Bittman stated, in the 1980 hearing print *Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)* (p. 58):

Yes, I am familiar with the book, because I am very sorry to admit that I am one of the coauthors of the book.

The book *Who's Who in the CIA* was prepared by the Czechoslovak intelligence service and the East German intelligence service in the mid 1960s. It took a few years to put it together. About half of the names listed in that book are real CIA operatives. The other half are people who were just American diplomats or various officials; and it was prepared with the expectation that naturally many, many Americans operating abroad, diplomats and so on, would be hurt because their names were exposed as CIA officials.



It was published under the name of Julius Mader. Many people here in this country, including many journalists, don't know that Julius Mader is actually an East German intelligence officer and author of several books dealing specifically with intelligence and propaganda.

Through 1991, *Geheim* and *Top Secret* continued to refer to *Who's Who in the CIA* as a source for the "Naming Names" section of their publications, despite the fact that this book had long been identified as Soviet-bloc disinformation. In addition, Julius Mader was a regular contributor to both *Top Secret* and *Geheim*, with articles appearing in 1988 and 1989.

*Top Secret* continued to carry the most egregious Soviet disinformation long after even the Soviet press had avoided this subject. For example, the Summer/Autumn 1990 issue of *Top Secret* carried an article "AIDS - its Nature and Origins" by Jacob and Lilli Segal. The Segals' false claim that AIDS was created at a U.S. military laboratory in Fort Detrick, Maryland formed the centerpiece of the USSR's AIDS disinformation campaign since their views were first published in 1986. By 1990, *Top Secret* was one of the few publications in the world to give these totally discredited views a sympathetic hearing.

Interestingly, *Geheim* did not run the AIDS disinformation story. As a German-language magazine, *Geheim* was aimed at a European audience, where the AIDS disinformation story does not have much credibility. But *Top Secret* was aimed at Africa, which was the prime target audience for Soviet disinformation on AIDS.

As mentioned earlier, Opperskalski played a role in a complex disinformation operation in 1989 that included the surfacing of a forgery and involved a Soviet-controlled front group. Stories in the *Namibian* newspaper on July 19, 28, and 31, 1989 contained disinformation claiming U.S.-South African collusion to rig the upcoming November 1989 elections in Namibia, including a forged letter purportedly from South African foreign minister "Pik" Botha to former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker. Disinformation from *Top Secret* appeared in the *Namibian* of July 31, and Opperskalski himself appeared at a press conference in Lusaka, Zambia on July 31, stating that he had just been in Namibia on a "fact-finding" mission sponsored by the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), a Soviet-controlled international front group. On September 19, 1989, Opperskalski and Nick Wright of Great Britain, the two journalists on the IOJ trip, gave a press conference in Prague, Czechoslovakia detailing their findings. The press conference was written up in the October 19, 1989 issue of the *IOJ Newsletter*.

In 1991, *Top Secret* suddenly became overtly anti-perestroika and more openly pro-Cuban, in a revealing shift of sympathies. In the lead editorial of *Top Secret*'s summer 1991 issue, Opperskalski stated:

Perestroika - what first appeared as an ostensible movement of renewal and democracy - has accomplished what some feared and others have not wanted to believe: the political, economic, and military degradation of the Soviet Union .... Moscow's leadership has been forced into the role of a direct or indirect accomplice of Washington's plans to gain hegemony. (In the future, *Top Secret* will expose the negative sides of this development, such as the Soviet cooperation with the [South African] apartheid regime, its setting up of contacts with Cuban contras, or its transmission of Iraqi military data to the CIA during the Gulf War. When necessary, we will extend our Naming Names feature from case to case as to include KGB agents who are responsible for destabilization activities and/or work together with the CIA, MOSSAD [the Israeli foreign intelligence service], NIS, and DMI [South African intelligence and security services]).

The inside back cover of the summer 1991 issue of *Top Secret* featured a large picture of Che Guevara, highlighting his calls for the destruction of the United States.

Thus, in 1991, *Top Secret* had announced its intention to become a vehicle for exposing and countering conciliatory Soviet policies, in addition to its usual role of spreading anti-American propaganda and disinformation. In making this move, it began to explicitly demonstrate strong pro-Cuban sympathies, a position compatible with that of Soviet hard-liners.

After the summer of 1991, no issues of *Top Secret* and *Geheim* appeared for one year. In June 1992, *Geheim* sent a letter to its subscribers, stating that a shortage of money was the main reason it had not been able to publish recently, and promising that it would begin publishing four issues per year, starting in September 1992, now that it had reorganized on a sounder financial basis. It will be interesting to examine the content of *Geheim*'s future issues in light of their financial reorganization.

### ***Looking To The Future***

An understanding of the types of active measures and disinformation operations pursued by the Soviets during the "post-Cold War" era is essential to analyzing future political influence operations. Any future such operations are likely to incorporate, in large part, many of the manipulative techniques that the Soviets pioneered and employed heavily in recent years.

A variety of state and non-state actors around the world continue to use sophisticated, crude, conciliatory, confrontational, and alarmist disinformation and active measures operations in their efforts to influence the perceptions and actions of foreign publics and governments. Remaining communist countries such as Cuba and North Korea have their own active measures and disinformation apparatuses. States or groups that have been trained by the CPSU, such as Iraq and the Palestine Liberation Organization, use these techniques in their foreign policy endeavors. Highly ideological, anti-Western regimes such as Iran or Libya have elaborated their own front group structures and appear to have few qualms about spreading anti-Western disinformation.

According to a report in the April 21, 1992 *New York Times*, Chinese authorities engage in active measures aimed at the United States. A recent Chinese document excerpted in the *Times* stated:

We want to ease tensions with the United States and break down the sentiment in America for sanctions.... We should take prudent and active measures, and properly report issues in Sino-American relations, so that bilateral relations develop in a way that will help us. Propaganda news stories must be careful and tactical, paying attention to results. As for American interference in our internal affairs, violations of our sovereignty, and slanderous rumor-mongering, we can reveal this in ways that accord with the circumstances and with our diplomatic aims.

In a May 19, 1992 letter to the editor of the *New York Times*, Robert Bernstein, chairman of Human Rights Watch, stated his belief that the Chinese authorities may be involved in spreading conciliatory disinformation. Bernstein said that two recently released photographs of imprisoned Chinese pro-democracy activists, which showed them in apparent good health, were "highly suspect," and he cast doubts on official Chinese accounts of the condition of imprisoned dissident Wei Jingsheng, who was jailed in 1979 after advocating that democracy become China's "fifth modernization."

On other occasions, the Chinese press has carried anti-American disinformation. On January 14, 1992, the Beijing newspaper *Jiefangjun Bao*, repeating charges that had appeared in the November 24, 1991 issue of the *People's Daily*, reported the false "baby parts" rumor. The article claimed:

Some surgeons in the United States were entrusted by rich people to find physically fit children in Brazil. After paying a certain sum of money to their poor parents, these surgeons were able to remove organs from the children through surgery.

Various communist parties around the world also continue to use disinformation and active measures techniques. For example, a March 1992 article in the French magazine *Viva* written by Maite Pinero, a correspondent for *L'Humanite*, the newspaper of the Communist Party of France, repeated a litany of long refuted and discredited "baby parts" allegations. Pinero's article was subsequently reported by Radio France International and appeared in the press in the Malagasy Republic.

Pinero is a longtime participant in what was a combined Soviet/Cuban/French Communist disinformation campaign on the so-called "baby parts" issue. Her initial article, tendentiously and inaccurately titled "Selling the Hearts of Children," appeared in the April 14, 1987 issue of *L'Humanite*, the same month in which the Soviet, Cuban, and Sandinista media in Nicaragua began to spread disinformation on this issue. *In May 1992, Pinero was in Geneva, Switzerland, passing out material on the "baby parts" rumor to journalists. The same month, Renee Bridel, an assistant representative of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), for decades a Soviet-controlled front group with consultative status at the United Nations, distributed disinformation on the "baby parts" story to another journalist in Geneva, resulting in a story carried by EFE, the Spanish news agency. IADL and Bridel have been very active in spreading the "baby parts" story since 1988. It is unclear whether she and Pinero were acting on their own in spreading this rumor in May 1992, or as part of a larger, coordinated operation.*

Within the former USSR, many elements of the former active measures apparatus have survived and continue to operate, maintaining informal links with embittered hard-line remnants of the former CPSU apparatus, who yearn to again wield power in the future. Also, important active measures entities such as the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (RFIS), the direct lineal descendant of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, and a variety of "nongovernmental" front groups continue to operate - now under Russian rather than Soviet sponsorship. In time, many of the independent states that made up the former Soviet Union may also develop their own active measures apparatuses.

In what appeared to be a striking display of continuity across regimes, on April 4, 1992 the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies (USFS) voted to transform itself into the Russian Association for International Cooperation, or RAMS in its Russian-language acronym. On May 12, 1992 Russian President Boris Yeltsin supported this initiative, proclaiming RAMS to be the legal successor to the USFS. Yeltsin decreed that all the property of the USFS, including real estate both on Russian territory and abroad, would be transferred to RAMS.

In a May 1992 announcement, RAMS stated:

The newly-established agency is an umbrella structure embracing over 100 cultural, human rights, educational, scientific, ecological, medical, etc. organizations, collective and associate members.

...RAMS maintains on a regular basis cooperation with similar structures in the former USSR republics. CEOs [Chief executive officers] of these organizations make up a coordinating committee which meets

on a regular basis to work out common approach [sic] toward financial contributions and joint use of property abroad.

...The budget is made up of membership dues, income-raising activities, and financial support of the Government on ear-marked programs.

RAMS also announced that Valentina Tereshkova, the chairperson of the USFS, had been elected chairperson of RAMS.

In this way, a key element of the Soviet active measures apparatus seems to have been transferred largely intact to the Russian government, which is now funding it instead of the CPSU. Much of the personnel remains the same. Thus, the Soviet friendship societies, which served the interests of the CPSU in the "people-to-people" realm, have been transformed into Russian friendship societies, which will now presumably serve Russian government interests, at least on certain "ear-marked" programs. Much the same sort of transformation process from Soviet to Russian institutions appears to be occurring throughout what was formerly the Soviet active measures apparatus.

The Soviet friendship societies were used to funnel money to nongovernmental groups in other countries that promoted friendship with the USSR. In May 1992, Alan Thompson, the former executive secretary of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship (NCASF), pleaded guilty to a charge of violating currency regulations in the United States. It was revealed that Thompson had received \$17,000 for NCASF operations in Moscow from Sergei Zimenko, a Soviet official of the USSR Friendship Society.

The February 7, 1992 issue of *Pravda* revealed an example of continuing active measures operations apparently undertaken by hard-liners in the former USSR. It reported that a "Committee of Public Organizations to Promote a Near East Settlement" had recently been formed under the chairmanship of V.M. Vinogradov. Vinogradov had served as a KGB officer in Great Britain in 1961. He stated that, in addition to contributing to the success of the Middle East peace talks, one of the main aims of his group was "to strengthen friendly ties to all countries of the region." In this regard, he complained that during the Moscow round of Middle East peace talks "disrespect was shown ... to Iran, Libya, and Iraq, which were not invited to the conference," and suggested that they be more fully included in the future.

Vinogradov criticized the Russian government's approach to the peace talks, which he said he did not place sufficient pressure on Israel to withdraw from territories it occupied. He concluded that "the Moscow round did not advance the cause of a settlement one iota."

In short, the stance of the newly-formed "Committee of Public Organizations to Promote a Near East Settlement" is anti-Yeltsin, anti-Israeli, pro-Iran, pro-Libya, and pro-Iraq, positions identical to those embraced by ousted communist hard-liners.

*Pravda* reported that the initiative to form Vinogradov's organization was:

supported by the Russian Society for Friendship with Arab Countries, the Russian Palestine Society, the International Association for the Cooperation of Lawyers, the Academy of the Spiritual Heritage of the East, the Association of Diplomatic Officials, the Committee for Friendship and Solidarity with the Palestinian People, the Russian Lawyer's Association, and the Public Academy of Culture and General Values.

These organizations or their predecessors previously functioned as parts of the Soviet active measures apparatus. It thus appears that, despite the demise of the CPSU, large parts of its active measures

machinery have survived and continue to operate, either on behalf of the Russian government or for disaffected former communist hard-liners who wish to undermine the Yeltsin government and forge closer ties to anti-Western regimes.

Vinogradov also stated that his committee had applied for the status of a nongovernmental organization at the United Nations, which was one of the main avenues through which Soviet front groups wielded their influence in the past.

On February 28, 1992, the former Soviet army newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* reported on a traditional Soviet-style active measures operation apparently undertaken by the Russian government. The newspaper reported that "a meeting of the aktiv of the international committee 'Peace to the oceans' and the Association of International Maritime Law" had adopted an appeal calling on the Commonwealth states to:

preserve for a transitional period a unified security system, a unified military-strategic area, and unified control of the CIS Armed Forces, and to declare a moratorium on the division of the Navy for at least two or three years.

This operation had many of the classic characteristics of a Soviet-style active measures operation, and, in fact, utilized one of the active measures organizations created during the "post-Cold War" era. The "Peace to the Oceans" front group was formed in June 1990, when the Soviets were making a concerted effort, through diplomatic and active measures channels, to pressure the West to accede to Soviet wishes to begin talks on naval disarmament. On July 3, 1990, Radio Moscow reported on the thoroughly stereotypical activities of this newly formed front group:

The inaugural conference of a new public organization has been held in Moscow. Around 200 representatives of the Soviet public - generals, admirals, lawyers, scientists, writers, and journalists - who were invited to the conference gave their unanimous backing to the idea of setting up a Soviet committee for peace, disarmament, and ecological security on the seas and oceans - abbreviated to the Soviet Committee for Peace to the Oceans....

This Soviet-created front group is now apparently being used by the Russian government for its purposes. Its appeal explicitly stated:

The "Peace to the Oceans" committee expresses support for the Russian Federation's president's initiatives and proposals on reducing the CIS Strategic offensive Armed Forces, including the Navy, on parity principles.

The article continued:

The lack of a unified CIS Navy, the appeal says, could lead to a possible naval arms race and the emergence of confrontation at sea. Only on the basis of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and a unified Navy is it possible to formulate a defensive doctrine that is acceptable to the sovereign states and could reliably avert all threats from the seas and oceans.

This heavy-handed attempt to label policies that active measures operations are meant to support as "peaceful" ones, which "avert threats" and make possible a "defensive doctrine," while alleging that contrary policies will lead to "confrontation," an "arms race," and the possibility of war is a familiar Soviet-style active measures practice.

It is also interesting that the committee's appeal was issued in the name of its "aktiv." In the Soviet system, a group's aktiv was the nucleus of its communist party organization.

Thus, although the Soviet active measures and disinformation colossus that sought for decades to undermine the Free World with a variety of hostile and manipulative campaigns has disintegrated, sizable fragments of the old system have survived and continue to operate. Some are sponsored by the Russian government and others apparently by disaffected communist hard-liners who wish to exert as much power as they can.

During the "post-Cold War" era, the Soviets used a wide variety of conciliatory, derogatory, alarmist, and other active measures themes - whatever they believed would work best in influencing their target audiences to take actions advantageous to the USSR.

Perhaps the most difficult task when analyzing active measures operations is to gauge their effectiveness. Soviet active measures were such an integral part of that nation's foreign policy operations and so broad in scope and intended effect, that it is impossible to rigorously isolate their effects with any degree of precision. But broadly speaking, they seem to have been effective in influencing foreign opinion. One recent article in *Moscow News* (issue number 14, 1992) provides some anecdotal evidence of this. It was written by Jim Doran, an American now living in Moscow. He stated:

Having lived in Moscow for just over one year now, I have had a unique opportunity to compare what was being said in the West about the former USSR with the reality that I have experienced on the streets each day. Unfortunately, there has often been a huge gap between the two.

...our Western analysis of the former USSR was beset by three broad misconceptions. The first, of course, was an immense overconcentration on the role of Gorbachev and a concomitant overglorification of the man. Much of Western thinking was so centered on Gorbachev that it failed to notice, as Hedrick Smith observes in *The New Russians*, that by mid-1989, Gorbachev had been overtaken by events and had ceased to be the main propellant for change in this society. It thus failed to appreciate the rise of Boris Yeltsin, noting only his character faults and completely ignoring the fact that on all the bread and butter issues, Yeltsin was clearly a more desirable leader than Gorbachev for both the Russians and the West.

The second misconception was that the USSR was a real country; that its existence was justified and that therefore its break-up was something to be avoided. The Soviet Union has been with us so long that many of us forgot that it was nothing more than the last European empire; an artificial, coerced entity, the majority of whose constituent parts wanted out.

The third misconception ... was that the Soviet people could do no better than reform communism. "They are just not ready for democracy" or "they should be satisfied with Gorbachev," many of our observers seemed to be saying. I have always found such thinking insulting and all the more so after having lived with the Russians.

It is perhaps more than coincidental that the beliefs in the West that Doran found to be the most mistaken about the USSR coincide, in large part, with the most important Soviet active measures campaigns of the "post-cold War" era, as described by former KGB major Mikhail Butkov, who defected to the West in May 1991. The December 15, 1991 issue of the British newspaper *The Independent* described Butkov and the active measures campaigns he helped run during 1989 to 1991:

After 10 years in the KGB, two of them on active service in a NATO capital, Major Butkov had decided he could better serve his country by defecting. The "discrepancies," as he describes them, between the publicly-stated reformist policies of Mikhail Gorbachev and the realities of an unreconstructed intelligence network bent on keeping the Communist Party in power were what prompted his decision.

...He told his debriefers about the dirty tricks used by the KGB on behalf of the Gorbachev regime as late as the spring of this year (1991) to try to undermine Boris Yeltsin and other key opposition figures.

...Their main task from the late 1980s was to blacken the names of Mr. Gorbachev's opponents and, through disinformation, to persuade the West to back him.

He spent ... three years at the KGB's Andropov Institute in Moscow. "These were the times of perestroika. But nevertheless we were taught that we were the Party's political warriors and should be proud of it."

...By the late 1980s some of the more extreme tactics of the old KGB were redundant. Department 8 of the Directorate S - the special assassination unit - had been dormant for more than a decade. The chief role of the KGB became and remained, even as late as this year, to attack internal opponents of the Gorbachev regime.

On the political front, the KGB stations were under orders to destabilize the opposition. Those around Mr. Yeltsin were to be quietly accused of taking money from the CIA, while the Lithuanian president, Vytautas Landsbergis, was marked down for "active measures" to portray him as a "member of the Mafia, a profiteer, an incompetent, ambitious megalomaniac with dictatorial tendencies." "On the strength of such directives, we would arrange meetings with sources and pass this information on," Mr. Butkov said.

Other active measures involved spreading the idea in the West that Gorbachev's disappearance and the break-up of the Soviet Union would lead to the creation of a number of aggressive republics with uncontrolled access to nuclear weapons. Mr. Butkov observes: "In his appeals to the West, Gorbachev used all the arguments that we were ordered to plant."

The era of Soviet active measures is gone forever, now relegated to history. But active measures operations continue, on the part of other totalitarian regimes and groups, extremist, anti-Western states, some Soviet successor regimes, and states in extremis.

The propensity of Soviet successor states to use the manipulative and deceptive techniques of active measures will depend to a large degree on the extent to which they act as what might be called "post-totalitarians," i.e., those whose ethics, habits, and methods of operation have been shaped in a totalitarian tradition and who continue to operate according to these rules of behavior. Hopefully, this will be a diminishing phenomenon and those who consciously repudiate and reject totalitarian methods will gain greater power and influence in the former USSR. The more influence that genuine democrats have in a Soviet successor regime, the less likely it is that it will engage in active measures.

Russia is a special case, because it has inherited the vast bulk of the assets of the Soviet active measures apparatus, by virtue of its central position within the former USSR. This alone will lead to the temptation to use these assets. But probably more important is the extent to which the Russian government, at all levels, is governed by genuine democrats or those who continue the totalitarian tradition in form, if not in its previous communist content.

As in the past, active measures will focus on the tasks of primary importance to the states that run them. For the USSR, this task was weakening the "main enemy," the United States, and increasing support for Soviet policies in the international arena.

Russia and the other CIS states have much different priorities. Their main tasks are, broadly speaking, to consolidate power at home, evolve advantageous relations with their CIS neighbors, and to win as much economic aid and assistance as possible on the most favorable terms. Active measures by CIS states are therefore most likely to be concentrated on achieving these goals. Thus, just as the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service now appears to be concentrating on economic and technological espionage, Russian active measures operations aimed at the West and the world community would likely focus heavily on improving Russian access to foreign funds and technology. But Russian concerns are not merely economic. For example, according to an ITAR-TASS report on May 8, 1992, then-acting Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev had told Russian military leaders that one of his primary tasks was to coordinate efforts with Russian military industry in developing advanced high accuracy weapons based on "new principles." Both espionage and active measures operations would logically be designed to help achieve this important Russian national goal.

Given the nature of the main tasks that the CIS states face in the immediate future - survival, consolidation, and revival - there is little reason for the active measures of Russia or other CIS states to be predominately anti-American in tone, as was the case during the Cold War era. They are more likely to be conciliatory, alarmist, or simply diversionary - whatever will work in order to achieve their economic, political, military, and other goals.

As long as foreign governments and groups continue to use active measures and disinformation campaigns to try to manipulate and deceive foreign governments and publics, there will be a need on the part of the U.S. government to monitor and analyze these activities, in order to try to separate fact from fiction, distinguish between genuine and disingenuous proposals, and to expose and counter cynically launched campaigns that are either openly anti-American or otherwise inimical to U.S. interests.

### ***Budgetary Implications***

Given the scant resources that were allocated within USIA to the task of tracking, analyzing, and countering Soviet active measures, the direct budgetary consequences of the collapse of the Soviet active measures apparatus are minuscule. During the better part of the past 10 years, the unit responsible for countering active measures and disinformation within USIA's Policy Guidance office has consisted of two full-time employees. Their efforts, of course, depended on extensive reporting from USIS (United States Information Service) posts overseas, where information officers watch for anti-American articles and items of misinformation and disinformation and report them to USIA headquarters. The role of the policy guidance officers at USIA headquarters is to do the background research necessary to respond to the allegations and to communicate this information and guidance to the field.

Despite the small size of the "counter-disinformation" staff, their efforts and that of USIA's leadership apparently played a major role in the Soviet decision to curtail sharply crude, anti-American disinformation during the "post-Cold War" era. According to an account in the September 19, 1991 issue of the Moscow newspaper *Kuranty*, protests by former USIA Director Charles Wick in June 1987 to



Valentin Falin, then the head of Novosti Press Agency, led to the disbanding of a disinformation unit within Novosti. The *Kuranty* article stated:

In 1987, the talk started circulating that the plague of the 20th century (AIDS) is not God's punishment, but the result of professional negligence of American bacteriologists. They - the tale went - ignorantly released the artificial virus developed by them from their secret test tubes before its time. This was a very serious accusation, considering what kind of paralyzing fear the mere word AIDS had been evoking. Once in a while references were actually made to some sources of minor authority, including even some European professor. For professionals, however, it was clear where the thing was coming from. ... That is why there was no doubt in the United States as to who had discovered the AIDS virus in American test tubes. The diagnosis was extremely quick. Soon afterwards the head of the American information agency USIA lodged a personal protest to then APN Chairman V. Falin. The addressee was selected extremely well. Shortly before the sensational "discovery" [that the U.S. had allegedly created the AIDS virus], a special group of staff, and not only staff, "undercover" APN employees was created by Falin's personal order, under the direction of Colonel M., newly invited to join the agency.

It is said that Falin had met the disinformation professional while serving as an ambassador to (then) West Germany. The acquaintance came in handy when Falin took charge of the agency. However, after the Americans, incensed by such a brazen lie, applied forceful pressure, the group was disbanded, and the colonel himself disappeared somewhere.

Despite the collapse of the Soviet active measures apparatus, there are still numerous anti-American articles in the media worldwide that require research and guidance from Washington. For example, the so-called "baby parts" rumor, which the Soviet disinformation apparatus embraced during 1987 and 1988, and again briefly in 1991, continues to be rampant in the world press. The USIA officers responsible for countering disinformation made a major contribution to U.S. public diplomacy during the coalition war against Iraq, working very effectively to counter a number of virulent anti-American disinformation campaigns spread by Iraq and its allies. Anti-American propaganda and disinformation continues to be spread by Iraqi, Cuban, Iranian, Libyan, and other governments and groups. As mentioned in the previous section, the active measures activities of states of the former Soviet union need monitoring for their impact on U.S. interests. The USIA officers responsible for countering active measures and disinformation have turned their attention to deal with these issues on a flexible, as-needed basis, and will continue to do so.

More broadly, the collapse of the Soviet active measures apparatus should bring a partial respite for USIS posts around the world, who act as the front lines of defense in responding to anti-American stories worldwide. Although the Soviet active measures apparatus was not responsible for the broad and diffuse phenomenon of anti-Americanism, it was the instrument that was most active in taking advantage of anti-American sentiments in order to create problems for the U.S. government in its foreign relations. With this deliberate source of trouble-making gone, the problems caused by it have receded. But, in many countries, the relentless decades of Soviet-sponsored anti-American propaganda and disinformation have shaped attitudes and caused or exacerbated problems that will continue to exist for many years to come.

In short, there is no large budgetary "windfall" for USIA from the collapse of the Soviet active measures apparatus. The small resources once devoted almost exclusively to this task have been shifted to other similar tasks.

**Appendix:**  
**Recent Revelations About**  
**Soviet Active Measures**

An Example of "Black" Active Measures:  
Alleged Soviet Agents of Influence and  
Covertly Sponsored Publications in Denmark

On January 2 and 5, 1992, The Danish newspaper *Ekstra Bladet* reported some fascinating revelations about alleged Soviet agents of influence in Denmark made by high-ranking KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky. They provide important insights into how Soviet agents of influence were handled and how the KGB used them to achieve its purposes.

After growing disillusioned with the Soviet system, Gordievsky began working secretly for British intelligence in 1974 while serving as a KGB officer in Copenhagen. He continued to rise within the KGB until 1985, when he was slated to become rezident, or chief of KGB operations in London. At this time, he came under suspicion and was recalled to Moscow for interrogation. With the help of the British, he managed to elude the KGB and escaped from the USSR to freedom. Gordievsky supervised KGB political influence operations in Denmark during his tour of duty there from 1973 to 1978, and is uniquely qualified to speak authoritatively about active measures operations in that country.

Gordievsky identified two people who he said were particularly successful Soviet agents of influence in Denmark. One was Jacob Holdt, the photographer and author of the widely disseminated book *American Pictures*. The other was Jorgen Dragsdahl, then and now the foreign affairs and defense specialist for the small but influential leftist, intellectual Danish newspaper *Information*, and from 1980 to 1983 a member of the Danish government's Security and Disarmament Policy Committee. Both men have denied acting as agents of Moscow, although Holdt has admitted receiving money from Soviet officials. Dragsdahl has claimed that the allegations in *Ekstra Bladet* are "untrue, defamatory, and a threat to my employment and welfare," and is suing the newspaper.

Jacob Holdt's book *American Pictures* contains hundreds of photographs showing scenes of extreme poverty in the United States, the vast majority involving blacks. It highlights the themes of racism and extreme poverty to the exclusion of virtually everything else.

According to *Ekstra Bladet*, when *American Pictures* was first published in 1977, Jacob Holdt had no connection with the KGB. But the KGB officers responsible for political influence operations in Copenhagen saw the value of a book like *American Pictures* and immediately targeted Holdt for recruitment. Gordievsky describes the process:

The KGB had a very great interest in Jacob Holdt because of *American Pictures*. It was decided that we should seek to recruit him as an agent and that task was given to my colleague Nikolai Petrovich Gribin.

In 1977, Gribin began to cultivate Jacob Holdt. He sought him out and invited him to luncheons. He treated him like a great treasure and he was quickly able to recruit the Dane. After a few months, Jacob Holdt began to take money from us. ... The KGB paid him significant sums.

In 1977, the Soviets were on the defensive because of President Jimmy Carter's human rights campaign. They regarded *American Pictures* as an effective tool in denigrating the U.S. human rights record, and

made plans to secretly boost its circulation. The January 2 *Ekstra Bladet* cited a top secret KGB workplan for active measures work in 1978, which stated:

There will be great power put behind our active measures in the following areas:

...Emphasis on the human rights abuses of the United States. The publication of [Jacob Holdt's] book in West Germany and Sweden, and help to assure its publication in Great Britain and help with activities in relation to [Jacob Holdt's] picture exhibit. Study possibilities to have the exhibit shown in other Western countries.

*American Pictures* became one of the most popular books about the United States in the Danish secondary school system, spreading its extremely unfavorable portrayal of the United States widely throughout Danish society.

Another top secret document sent from KGB headquarters to Copenhagen stated, according to *Ekstra Bladet*, that the active measures campaign "which involved the publication, distribution, and publicity for the book *American Pictures* earns special recognition" and had been reported to the highest Soviet authorities, including the Politburo. Gordievsky concluded by characterizing Jacob Holdt as a "first class agent of influence," stating, "Jacob Holdt was a true and real agent. He fulfilled the criteria and we paid him."

In his book *Instructions from the Centre*, Gordievsky explained the criteria the KGB used for determining whether an individual was considered to be a fully recruited agent:

In order to qualify as a full KGB agent, the "subject of deep study" has to fulfill two main conditions. First, he (or she) has to agree to secret, "conspiratorial" collaboration. Second, he (or she) must be willing to accept instructions from the KGB. Targets who fail to meet with either of these conditions are classed only as "confidential contacts;" their chances of subsequent promotion to full agent status are slim. (p. 40)

Gordievsky said that Holdt fulfilled the criteria for being a Soviet agent.

Holdt has denied this. He admitted meeting with Gribin for years and stated that he once took 10,000 kroner (more than \$2,000) from him, but insisted, "I do not consider myself their agent." Holdt, who raised money for poor African countries, explained the relationship in these terms:

It is clear that the KGB had plans for me. I knew that. But I had my own plans. I had something to do with the KGB but I also frequented prostitutes and murderers. I was indifferent to where I got the money that was needed in Africa.

*Ekstra Bladet* commented:

We have talked with people who know Jacob Holdt and they all explain that he is an idealistic man who has done important work for the oppressed. No one has anything bad to say about him. He has shown the world how it should treat the weak. But those were strange friends he had when he was entrapped by the KGB.

According to KGB documents cited by *Ekstra Bladet*, the KGB also wished to use Holdt to recruit other agents. One KGB document stated, under the topic of "Principal goal for agent infiltration in the work against the Main Enemy [the United States]:"

Intensify the study of [Jacob Holdt's] contacts. The idea is that we lead him to people who have a potential interest in working against the Main Enemy and the idea is that we should think, later on, of getting [Jacob Holdt] to recruit them under "false flag" pretenses.

A "false flag" recruitment is one in which a person is convinced to work on behalf of, in this case, Soviet intelligence, but given the false impression that he is working for another government. In this way, individuals who would have been repulsed by the idea of working for the Soviets could have been recruited to do anti-American work. The Soviets envisaged such a recruiting role for Holdt.

Jorgen Dragsdahl is a much different person than Jacob Holdt. He has been a prominent and, by all accounts, extremely well informed writer on foreign affairs and defense issues for *Information*, a small circulation Danish newspaper that is influential in the Danish foreign affairs and security community. In the January 5, 1992 issue of *Ekstra Bladet*, Gordievsky described how he said the KGB had recruited Dragsdahl as an agent of influence:

The whole thing began in the middle of the 1970s, when I was the second in command for political espionage (Line PR) at the KGB station in Denmark. Dragsdahl had written some quite pro-Soviet articles in *Information* and we decided to try to get to know him.

It was my colleague KGB officer Stanislav Chebotok who had the task of testing out Dragsdahl and he quickly made contact with him. In fact, within a very short time, he was very close friends with Dragsdahl. We began slowly to involve him.

When Stanislav Chebotok had gotten a good hold on Dragsdahl, he began to give him ideas about what he should write in *Information* when he treated important political and military issues. We gave him facts and arguments.

What happened is that more and more Dragsdahl began to use Chebotok's suggestions in his writing. Everyday, Chebotok sat and read *Information* with a magnifying glass. We could confirm that Dragsdahl, to a rising degree, reflected the KGB's thinking.

In 1977-1978, the last year that I was in Copenhagen, Dragsdahl was very active and the resident Mikhail Petrovich Lyubimov was so fascinated by him that he took him over himself, that is to say, Lyubimov became his case officer.

Gordievsky considered Dragsdahl to be an unusually effective Soviet agent of influence. He explained why:

Dragsdahl was gifted and wrote well. He had imagination and he knew a great deal about military-strategic and political questions. But what made him such an unusual agent was that he was so sophisticated. There are not many others that were.

The most important thing was that he presented the KGB's ideas to his readers in a very artful fashion. His articles were not primitive propaganda drivel. They showed from far and away that Dragsdahl was extremely well informed and he referred to points of view from all sorts of places. In this way, it was impossible for readers to discover where he obtained the things that the KGB put in his head.

Evening after evening Chebotok and Lyubimov sat and talked about what they should feed him the next time, what ideas they should give him. The problem was precisely that Dragsdahl did not swallow all the propaganda. He had his own viewpoints and sometimes he rejected the KGB's ideas because he thought they were too primitive. He was very creative himself.

It was precisely that that made him so useful and so loved. If Chebotok and Lyubimov had given him 4 or 5 arguments for the next article on a particular subject, they were surprised when they read it. Lyubimov would say, "It's extraordinary. We gave him only 4 or 5 ideas, but he's written 10 things which are as if they had come out of our mouths. He's better at it than we ourselves are."

The fantastic thing about Dragsdahl was not just that the KGB could use him as a very sophisticated channel to bring forward its views (anti-Americanism, anti-NATO politics, etc.). In addition, he himself created such viewpoints and published them. Dragsdahl worked together actively with the KGB to undermine Western viewpoints. It was very goal-oriented disinformation.

I know these things for certain because I got all the reports about Dragsdahl from his case officer.

People in Service A said that this was just what they needed and the First Chief Directorate in Moscow expressed the same viewpoint. It was the most refined form of Soviet propaganda: to allow a respected Western political commentator to serve it.

When Dragsdahl in the meantime wrote critically about the Soviet Union, it was also water for the KGB's mill. It was this refinement that heightened his credibility.

According to Gordievsky, Dragsdahl wrote articles that contributed to the following KGB active measures efforts:

- 1) the campaign against the neutron bomb.
- 2) the campaign against President Jimmy Carter's human rights policy.
- 3) the campaign against NATO's deployment of the Pershing II rocket and cruise missiles in Europe
- 4) to try to give the West the impression that the Soviet threat was not so bad.
- 5) the disarmament negotiations.

These were the major Soviet active measures campaigns during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Gordievsky also stated that Dragsdahl was paid large sums of money by the KGB when he met with his case officer in Vienna and Budapest:

I don't know what he got, but I know that the sums that the KGB normally paid an agent when one met with him in a third country capital. The typical payment was \$15,000 to \$20,000 in cash.

The January 5 *Ekstra Bladet* article concluded with some, interesting observations on the relationship between Jacob Holdt and Jorgen Dragsdahl:

In recent days, Jorgen Dragsdahl has written in *Information* understandingly and in a friendly fashion about his old friend, the photographer Jacob Holdt, who has been revealed in *Ekstra Bladet* as a KGB agent.

Jacob Holdt told *Ekstra Bladet*, "Dragsdahl was the man who made me famous. It was he who promoted the book *American Pictures* and it was also he who thought up the title. No one has done more for this project than Dragsdahl."

*American Pictures* was published by the publishing house associated with *Information*, where Dragsdahl worked.

Interestingly, Dragsdahl was also a close student of the concept of "non-offensive defense," an idea that originated in the West but which was adopted by Moscow for its own purposes and became one of the main slogans of "new political thinking." The U.S. magazine *The Nation* reported in its April 17, 1989 issue:

Ironically, Gorbachev appropriated the ideas of European and American researchers in devising the sweeping proposal [on a "non-offensive" military doctrine] forwarded last month in Vienna. Jorgen Dragsdahl, a defense writer and editor with the Copenhagen daily *Information*, has traced this influence and attributes it to peace researchers such as Anders Boserup in Denmark, Robert Neild in Britain, and Horst Afheldt in West Germany. Through seminars and consultations with Soviet policy analysts, some of their ideas gradually filtered into the Kremlin. A few diplomats, notably Lev Meldelevich, former ambassador to Denmark, took a keen interest in the theories and channeled them back to Moscow.

This raises the intriguing possibility that Dragsdahl may have been influential not just in allegedly carrying out KGB instructions in Denmark, but may also have also played a role in helping provide some of the raw material that Soviet ideologists used to devise some of the core concepts of "new political thinking." As explained in the chapter on "The Conciliatory Slogans of New Political Thinking," ideas such as "non-offensive defense" were at the heart of Soviet active measures operations from 1988 to late 1990, and again from the spring of 1991 to the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991.

It is also interesting to note that *Information* was one of the few noncommunist publications in the world to participate in one of the most objectionable Soviet disinformation campaigns of the Gorbachev era, which falsely accused the U.S. government of killing the 918 people who died in the Jonestown mass suicide in Guyana in 1978. The June 6-7, 1987 issue of *Information* included a book review of the Soviet book *Death of Jonestown - Crime of the CIA*, which made these absurd claims. This particularly crude and egregious Soviet disinformation campaign was almost universally ignored in the noncommunist world. *Information* found it worthy of note, however.

**Appendix:**  
**Recent Revelations About**  
**Soviet Active Measures**

"Gray" or Semi-covert Active Measures

Recent revelations in the Soviet press have shed light on the role the CPSU CC International Department played in coordinating "gray" active measures operations, which included the activities of Soviet-allied communist parties, Soviet-controlled international front organizations, and Soviet nongovernmental organizations that played a role in foreign affairs, particularly friendship societies, the foreign policy-related institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and the Soviet affiliates of the international front groups.

On February 11, 1992 *Izvestia* reported some of the results of the Russian prosecutor's investigation of the financial activity of the CPSU. It stated:

Since 1981, financial assistance was being provided to 98 parties and movements on all continents: 23 of them in Europe, 31 in North and South America, 16 in Asia, 27 in Africa, and to Australian communists. There were "favorites" among them. The number one among the latter were French communists: \$24 million during the past 10 years; next came the communists in the United States - million; Finland - 16.6

million; Portugal - 9.5 million; Chile - \$6 million; Lebanon - \$5.2 million, and India - \$5.1 million. Frequently, in the same country several political organizations were on the CPSU's payroll at the same time. For instance, in Chile the money was divided between the communist, workers-peasant, socialist, and radical parties.

...In order to provide carefree existence for the "ideological fighters," a special international fund was set up. Formally, it existed on contributions from East European parties: the CPSU, Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, and Bulgarian and Czechoslovak communists. However, the participation of our socialist camp comrades was minimal; their joint efforts barely produced \$2.5 million. The CPSU, however, did things on a grand scale: its annual contribution to the collective Peggy bank was between \$15 million and \$22 million a year.

...the leaders of the parties and movements especially favored by Old Square [the headquarters of the CPSU CC] would send touching letters to the CPSU CC.... At times, the arguments used were quite unexpected.

...General Secretary of the Communist Party of El Salvador: "Due to expansion of our military forces, and increased procurement of uniforms, food, and medical supplies for our partisan groups, our expenses have increased."

...South West African People's Organization [SWAPO] leaders in Namibia: "Our party was only able to function in the last few years thanks to the CPSU's assistance."

Probably the most frank among these requests were those from the Israeli communists, who simply wrote that they needed money because: "To pay our party functionaries a salary of less than \$3,000 a month is simply inhumane."

...This document (on CPSU funding of foreign parties), being of an especially delicate nature, was considered in an unusual way - in the apparat jargon, it was "sent round:" it was secretly brought to the office of each Politburo member where he, without anyone else present, had to write his opinion: for or against. During the past 15 years, there had been no dissent on this subject, however.

In further documentary evidence, on February 29, 1992, the *Washington Post* published a picture of a receipt for two million dollars in CPSU funds, dated March 14, 1987, signed by Gus Hall, head of the Communist Party of the United States.

The parties funded by the CPSU, as part of the its active measures apparatus, organized demonstrations, held meetings, printed publications, engaged in subversive actions, and otherwise engaged in political and military activities in their countries in an effort to help achieve the goals of Soviet foreign policy.

During the late 1980s, Alexander Yakovlev was the CPSU CC Secretary in charge of supervising International Department operations, including the funding of foreign communist parties. On February 17, 1992, *Izvestia* reported Yakovlev's remarks on this issue:

In 18 months, he said, Yakovlev managed to achieve a reduction in appropriations for these fine purposes from about \$25 million a year to approximately \$12 million and, if he had had his way, he would have stopped these illegal payments altogether. But he did not manage to do that; he could not overcome the blank resistance from the well-tuned system which had been functioning for decades.

Direct Soviet funding of foreign communist parties was only one way in which the CPSU supported these parties. CPSU documents released on June 5, 1992 revealed that in 1969 the USSR sold 600,000 tons of

oil at privileged rates to an Italian company for \$4 billion, some of which was later transferred to the Italian Communist Party. Thus, the CPSU had many ways to financially support foreign communists or other allies.

On January 7, 1992 an article in *Izvestia* illuminated the role played by one Soviet "nongovernmental" organization, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, in active measures operations. This "public" organization acted as a transmission belt for Soviet policies in the "people-to-people" realm. *Izvestia* wrote:

The Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries (SCSAAC) held a special place in the structure of the now defunct totalitarian system's foreign policy service. The hackneyed, semi-literate title concealed a Central Committee-KGB subunit which had links with dozens of countries in Africa and Asia. This was portrayed as the Soviet public's contacts with the public in that part of the "Third World." But the label concealed something quite different.

All the organizational work was conducted by an apparatus of specialist functionaries. They were appointed by the CPSU Central Committee and strictly toed the party line. As for foreign partners, ... they dealt with kindred organizations, parties, and governments (often maintained by Soviet money) and all this was done exclusively for the purpose of coordinating steps in the joint march toward the radiant future and developing the anti-imperialist (for which read anti-U.S.) struggle.

The committee performed not only communications functions but also provided covert financing from a special Central Committee fund and supplied weapons to various detachments of the "national liberation movement."

...Its track record shows many years of support for the African National Congress, the essentially tyrannical Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, and totalitarian dictatorships in Libya, Uganda, and Equatorial Guinea. ...The list could go on and on. ...the SCSAAC did not once act in defense of violated civil rights and freedoms, flouted democracy, or manifestations of totalitarianism. It had more important business - strengthening contacts with its friends in the common cause.

Even during the years of perestroika the committee remained true to itself and continued the line of its beloved Central Committee. ...And then, holding out until the very last moment, the committee, instead of disbanding itself and disappearing ingloriously from the public arena, performed an ungainly somersault and reappeared as ... the Russian society for Solidarity and Cooperation with the Peoples of Asia and Africa.

It is legitimate to ask: Why is it necessary to legalize one of the most odious ideological institutions of the old era? Is it really enough just to change the name and leave the functionaries, convenient sinecure untouched?

The SCSAAC was one of the 10-15 major Soviet "public organizations" that worked to achieve Soviet foreign policy goals in the "people-to-people" realm. Each of these Soviet "nongovernmental" organizations also acted as the core member of a supposedly independent but actually Soviet-controlled international front group that the Soviets had set up as a disguised instrument through which they pursued their foreign policy aims. In this way, the SCSAAC acted as a conduit for Soviet control in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, headquartered in Cairo, which had 91 affiliates in different countries. The activities of this group and its affiliates were orchestrated by Moscow. The Soviets controlled similar national and international groups organized around the areas of women, youth, peace, scientists, lawyers, journalists, trade unions, students, teachers, physicians, and religion. This



system of Soviet-controlled and -influenced front groups provided a powerful means for influencing attitudes and political systems worldwide through "people-to-people" channels.

An examination of the archives of the International Department would shed light on how it controlled, manipulated, and influenced hundreds, if not thousands, of organizations worldwide. When the CPSU CC archives were opened to the public in March 1992, however, access to ID archives less than 30 years old was banned under a newly devised secrecy rule. The Russian leaders were apparently not ready to reveal the story of the recent Soviet manipulation of foreign communist and leftist parties and control of a panoply of international front groups. Many of these continue to operate in the international arena.

***Appendix:***  
***Recent Revelations About***  
***Soviet Active Measures***

"White" or Overt Active Measures

"White" active measures in the Soviet press were coordinated by the international information subdepartment of the CPSUCC Ideology Department, prior to 1986 known as the CPSU CC International Information Department (IID). The difference between the IID and the International Department (ID) is that IID staffers would develop themes and arguments for Soviet propaganda organs while ID staffers would work directly with organizations that played a role in international affairs. In order to become a staff member of the IID, fluency in a foreign language, significant work abroad (often for 5-10 years), or at least 5 years experience in a central propaganda organ were the typical requirements.

Despite its benign sounding cover name, the International Information Department was known within the Central Committee for its close links with the KGB. For example, the deputy head of the IID in the mid 1980s, Nikolai Chetverikov, assumed this position after being expelled from France in April 1983 for espionage activities. Former Politburo member and CPSUCC Secretary Alexander Yakovlev pointed out the special status of the IID in *Izvestia* on February 17, 1992. He stated:

In general for a long time there was a provision banning the recruitment to work in the Central Committee of people from the KGB. Only later, when the International Information Department was formed, was this provision for some reason repealed for it.

One key component of the "white" active measures apparatus was the Novosti Press Agency (APN). The activities of Novosti's department of political publications, which specialized in active measures, were discussed in the Moscow newspaper *Kuranty* on September 19, 1991. The article provides an inside look at how the 30-40 active measures specialists working there on assignment from KGB's Service A devised arguments and assembled information for covert media placements, which were then published in an unattributed or falsely attributed fashion throughout the world and often subsequently replayed in Soviet media:

The purposes of the part-time craftsmen, concentrated in the main editorial offices for political publications and some other structures, was to conduct "black propaganda:" to prepare articles, books, brochures, or simply argumentation in which, to the extent possible, the "Soviet ears" would be invisible. ... it is not always convenient, for instance, to defend the interests of Kremlin policy with the help of "opuses" by official authors.... It is another matter if an independent newspaper or a magazine, published in faraway foreign cities and towns, publishes an article written from an entirely neutral

position, using generalized facts found in Western publications, and on top of it is signed by a local journalist or public figure.

...What is important is that these objectivist materials pushed the same ideas directed at Western politicians and ordinary folks: to boycott the Soviet market means to prolong unemployment; American grain sent to the starving people of Africa is poisoned by pesticides; the Soviets really do not have a superiority in tanks and missiles, and so on. The effect of the action depends, of course, not only on the quality and smartness of arguments prepared in the Western style, but also on where the unrenowned opus is published and under whose signature.

...the disinformation operation ... does not end with the publication of a skillfully planted scholastic thesis. The highest aerobatics is to quote an already planted "duck" in - this time - quite official propaganda: See, even the West European press is indignant over the machinations of the wily Uncle Sam. So, it is a sacred task for us to stop these wily efforts.

The *Kuranty* article also explains how the KGB disinformation specialists working at Novosti were able to use their position to tap into the resources of the hundreds of world-class scholars working at Soviet academic institutes, who supplied them with well researched information and carefully crafted arguments that bolstered the active measures themes decided upon by CPSU and KGB officials:

Disinformation requires daily laborious work. ...[And] to tell the truth, God deprived many [KGB] officers ... of any talents. Except, of course, the predilection to report on others. Which necessitates "borrowing" someone else's gray matter and commissioning the needed articles and collections of theses to experts.

It is not advisable, however, to call, for instance, an ISKAN [USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the United States and Canada] researcher from such a [KGB] center, or invite him for a meeting at a secret residence. It is quite another matter to call from a known moonlighters' feeding bin, as the APN had been for decades, and ask him to write a five or six-page article.

It is true that the topics sometimes shocked some "egghead Sovs." Some refused under the pretext that the suggested interpretation of facts would not correspond to reality. Naive people, they sincerely tried to educate their telephone interlocutors, who looked to be complete ignoramuses in their eyes.

...Sometimes commissions fell through despite the fact that scientists, many of whom were unique specialists, were coming under pressure locally by bosses who had received a call from somewhere "at the top" or by the "undercover [KGB] officers" in their own institute. ...But most of the time the specialists agreed to earn some extra milk for the kids without questions: meet the deadline and provide the number of the savings bank account to deposit the honorarium. It is not our business. If somebody orders material that the Americans are just about to strike a deal with the Russians behind Western Europe's back, it means that somebody needs it. ...Everybody has to make a living.

Thus, the totalitarian nature of the Soviet political system made it possible to construct an elaborate system for influencing foreign public opinion and actions in a highly sophisticated way. The resources at the disposal of the Soviet active measures apparatus were immense, as were their means of spreading the various messages and themes that they crafted, as the following example illustrates.

In March 1992, Father Gleb Yakunin, a former Soviet dissident who is now a member of the Russian parliament and the vice-chairman of a committee that is investigating KGB archives, visited the United States and distributed KGB and CPSU CC Propaganda Department documents that illustrated how these officials worked together to orchestrate the domestic and foreign media coverage of events in the USSR.

One document Yakunin distributed was signed by the Deputy Chief of the CPSU CC Propaganda Department, P. Slezko, on April 21, 1986. It concerned media coverage of the 40th anniversary of the Lvov Church convocation, the vehicle which Stalin used in 1946 to dissolve the Uniate (Catholic) Church in the Ukraine, confiscating its property and forcibly merging it into the Russian Orthodox Church.

The Central Committee document warned:

The Vatican and anti-Soviet Uniate-nationalist centers of the West are making an attempt to resurrect Uniate religion in the Ukraine. ...[They] are disseminating slanderous fabrications and insinuations about the lack of freedom of conscience in the USSR, the persecution of believers, and calling them "to return to the fold of the Ukrainian Catholic Church."

In light of these problems, the CPSU propagandists stated:

In order to counter the anti-Soviet actions of the Vatican and foreign Uniate-nationalist centers, ... the following measures to widely mark the 40th anniversary of the Lvov Church Convocation may be considered:

- to conduct ... celebrations ... of the 40th anniversary of the Lvov Church Convocation with the invitation of Orthodox Church delegations from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, and also representatives of the World Council of Churches; to invite Western journalists accredited in Moscow, and also media representatives from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania for the celebration of the jubilee; to satisfy the request of Austrian television about the creation of a documentary film about the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Lvov Church Convocation for showing through channels on West European television;
- to instruct TASS, APN, and USSR Gosteleradio (Soviet television and radio) to enlighten foreign audiences about said jubilee;
- to instruct USSR Goskino (the State Committee on Films) to create, on orders of the Moscow Patriarchate, a documentary about the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Lvov Convocation for showing abroad with the subsequent preparation of films;
- for the editors of *Izvestia*, *New Times*, the weekly *Moscow News* to prepare and publish materials connected with the 40th anniversary of the Lvov Convocation and its meaning.

A May 1986 KGB document distributed by Yakunin recorded their assessment of this event:

A large group of agents of the organs of the KGB, including "Adamant," "Antonov," "Lukyanov," "Skala," and others, took part in organizing and conducting measures. The celebration, in which about 300 guests and 10 representatives of foreign orthodox churches took part, took place in a spirit receptive to us. Positive influence was rendered on the foreigners, and interviews of a positive character were taken from several. Materials about the celebration were broadcast abroad through the mass media for counterpropaganda purposes.

In line with our orientation, the Lvov Oblast [region] KGB cut short attempts of foreign journalist E. Zigli (Federal Republic of Germany) to collect tendentious information about the situation of the church in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

In this way, the Central Committee Propaganda Department and the KGB worked together to orchestrate the "news" in and about the USSR.

**Appendix:**  
**Recent Revelations About**  
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Manipulation of the Russian Orthodox Church  
& the World Council of Churches:  
How "Black," "Gray," and "White"  
Active Measures Worked Together

One particularly cynical aspect of Soviet active measures operations was the way in which the atheist Soviet authorities exploited the Russian Orthodox Church and other official religious institutions in the USSR in order to bolster Soviet foreign policy by appealing to religious sentiments in the noncommunist world. The Soviet government's Council on Religious Affairs and the KGB were the instruments of Soviet control of these religious groups.

CPSU active measures operations apparently took priority in the Church's activities over more traditional church functions. For example, issue number 6 of *Moscow News* in 1992 reported that the foreign relations department of the Russian Orthodox Church employed more than one hundred people, whereas the charities and educational departments were staffed by only a dozen each. The article also referred to "well-substantiated allegations that the present Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev [a prominent church leader] is a KGB agent bearing the code name "Antonov."

Metropolitan Pitirim, head of the Church's publications department, was also identified as a KGB agent by Vyacheslav Polosin, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet's Committee on Denominations and Freedom of Religion, in the January 21, 1992 issue of the Russian newspaper *Megapolis Ekspress*.

Polosin also alleged that, in 1983, in part due to the efforts of a KGB network within the World Council of Churches (WCC), Emilio Castro was elected as that organization's General Secretary. A KGB document cited by Polosin described Castro as "a candidate acceptable to us."

In 1987, the State Department's report on *Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986-1987* made these comments about Soviet efforts to influence the World Council of Churches through Russian Orthodox Church officials and through the Christian Peace Conference, a Soviet-controlled international front organization. It specifically mentioned that WCC General Secretary Castro's views had been a factor in the WCC's "receptivity" to Soviet initiatives:

During the 1960s and 1970s, the WCC's focus shifted away from traditional ecumenical dialogue toward policy stands on contemporary social and political issues, some of which paralleled Soviet stands. Soviet church officials have been increasingly active in encouraging WCC support for policy lines that the USSR also supports, and for using its fora for presenting official Soviet views. In part, the WCC's receptivity is due to its leadership. WCC General Secretary Emilio Castro is an advocate of liberation theology who was exiled from Uruguay for his links to leftist organizations.

The WCC sometimes sponsors organizations or activities that have some form of affiliation with Soviet front organizations. On occasion, the WCC works with the Christian Peace Conference [CPC] or its affiliates to encourage foreign governments to remove U.S. military bases.

The Christian Peace Conference works assiduously to influence WCC rhetoric and actions. In preparation for the 1983 WCC General Assembly in Vancouver, Canada, a conference of Christian women met in Kiev in April 1983. The women were instructed on how to coordinate their activities in Vancouver with the CPC and the Russian Orthodox Church delegation. The result was the defeat of a pending resolution demanding an immediate Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Russian Orthodox and CPC representatives argued successfully that if the General Assembly voted to condemn the invasion, the East European women and Soviet clergy would not be permitted to attend future WCC meetings. For similar reasons the WCC declined to take note of or act on messages from persecuted East European Christians at the same gathering. (*Democracies Under Strain*, Institute for the Public Interest, No. 3, June 1986).

WCC representatives have cooperated with the preeminent Soviet front, the World Peace Council, in hosting a nongovernmental organization symposium on "World Peace and the Liberation of South Africa and Namibia" at the WCC headquarters in Geneva, June 11-13, 1986.

WCC headquarter's support for radical leftist and/or violent movements in the Third World has already caused considerable controversy with member churches, particularly over the open funding of South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia and the African National Congress. (p. 12)

The activities of the Russian Orthodox Church were supervised by department four (specializing in ecclesiastical matters) of the KGB Fifth Directorate, which monitored "ideological" issues. Father Gleb Yakunin is vice Chairman of a Russian parliamentary commission that has investigated the activities of the KGB, and, as a clergyman, took a special interest in documents relating to Church affairs. In the Russian newspaper *Argumenty i Fakty*, issue number one in January 1992, Yakunin described verbatim excerpts from KGB documents that described their efforts to influence the policies of the World Council of Churches. They provide an insider's look at the decades-long Soviet campaign to manipulate an important, prestigious, and influential world organization.

1967

At meetings of the Executive Committee and of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches in September in Crete, agents "Svyatoslav," "Voronov," "Antonov" and others condemned the aggressive acts of the U.S.A. in Vietnam and of Israel in the Middle East. The Russian Orthodox Church delegation voted against the resolutions on Vietnam and the Middle East put forward by representatives of churches in the West, and called for a debate on the situation of the blacks in the U.S.A.

August 1969

Our agents succeeded in promoting the agent "Kuznetsov" to a leading position in the World Council of Churches.

In March 1992, Yakunin visited the United States and distributed other materials describing the KGB's efforts to manipulate the World Council of Churches. The following are verbatim excerpts from these KGB documents:

August 1969 line 204

Agents "Svyatoslav," "Adamant," "Altar," "Magister," "Roshchin," and "Zemnogorskiy" went to England for participation in the work of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches. The agency

[KGB] managed to thwart hostile activities, and agent "Kuznetsov" managed to penetrate the WCC directorate.

February 1972 line 90

Agents "Svyatoslav" and "Mikhailov" went to New Zealand and Australia for sessions of the Central Committee of the WCC.

July 1983 line 191

47 agents of the KGB organs among religious authorities, clergy, and technical personnel from the USSR delegation were sent to Vancouver (Canada) for the 6th WCC General Assembly.

July 1989 line 233

In accordance with a plan authorized by the leadership of the KGB of the USSR, agency-operative and organizational measures were undertaken for ensuring state security in the period of preparations for and conduct of measures during the meeting of the World Council of Churches in Moscow, in which more than 500 foreign religious activists took place. Eight declarations and 3 messages corresponding to the political line of the socialist countries were adopted as a result of measures rendered by the executive committee and central committee of the WCC.

The July 25-31, 1989 issue of the Soviet magazine *New Times* had mentioned the WCC meeting in Moscow. It noted that "the bulk of technical arrangements ... has been placed in the hands of Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and Byelorussia [a different person than Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Galicia] .... 11 Filaret of Minsk was chairman of the Russian Orthodox Church's Department for Foreign Church Relations. He has also been revealed as a prominent member of the KGB's network in the Russian Orthodox Church. In *Argumenty i Fakty* issue number 8 of 1992 in February, A. Shushpanov, a former staff member of the Foreign Church Relations Department who worked as a KGB agent, stated that the Metropolitan was the only church member authorized to receive his reports:

The KGB required us to submit reports on when and where foreigners would drop in for visits, whether to a store, the toilet, or whatever. A report was submitted in five copies, one of which went to the desk of the Foreign Church Relations Department chairman [Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and Byelorussia]; the second copy went to the Council on Religious Affairs [the governmental body that oversaw religious affairs], which was, in essence, a branch of the KGB; and the remaining copies were transmitted directly to the KGB.

The Metropolitan made some comments for the *New Times* article in which he revealed his enthusiasm for some of the main slogans of "new political thinking:"

"The conference is going to become another evidence of the moral and intellectual consolidation of the Christian world in the face of a wide range of threats to humanity - from the threat of war to that of an ecological disaster. The World Council of Churches has never kept away from politics, in some instances it even went ahead of the foreign policy departments of various countries in carrying out certain peace initiatives," says Metropolitan Filaret. (p. 45)

The Metropolitan also told *New Times* that he was planning to include a "special seminar on perestroika in the Soviet Union" in the WCC's deliberations.

The Soviet active measures apparatus then used the proceedings of the WCC Moscow conference as grist for media placements worldwide. For example, soon after the meeting, an article in the August 19, 1989 issue of the Nigerian newspaper *Daily Star* entitled "Perestroika Surveyed" mentioned the WCC conference and specifically its session on perestroika:

The [Russian Orthodox] Church is taking up its role as a partner in the new dialogue brought about by perestroika, according to Russian Orthodox Archbishop Kirill of Smolensk.

A major reason it has been able to do so, Kirill told a forum on perestroika during the meeting of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches is "that many of our theologians and church leaders have gone through the 'school of the WCC.'"

Kirill, a WCC Executive Committee member, ... said that for many years much of what the WCC talked about "seemed strange, alien to our interests. Now, however, the agenda of the WCC is also our agenda."

Another apparent Soviet media placement in the same issue of the *Daily Star* illustrated how the Soviet active measures apparatus could use meetings such as the WCC conference to propagate its themes without once mentioning Soviet involvement in the conference or Soviet influence on it. The article, "Biotechnology Problems Probed," described how WCC Central Committee members had recently been treated to a special "deliberative session," ostensibly designed to alert them to "emerging issues of biotechnology," without mentioning that this complex issue was slanted in an anti-Western direction, and included many themes favored by Soviet active measures specialists. Thus, the session warned about allegedly dire new threats to the Third World from volatile and dangerous biotechnology products that might be dumped there by industrialized countries, as well as the supposed threat that industrial countries might impoverish Third World economies by creating synthetic substitutes that would eliminate the market for Third World agricultural commodities. The session went so far as to resurrect the old Soviet disinformation campaign about an "ethnic weapon," which supposedly would selectively target members of non-white races. No such weapon exists, of course.

According to the article, one Sri Lankan delegate to the WCC meeting thanked the session organizers for "shocking me out of my complacency."

The *Daily Star* article stated:

A description of recent developments in biology and genetics, interspersed with case studies and scenarios of the impact that applications of these are having or might have on people, offered members of the WCC Central Committee a broad and sobering introduction to emerging issues of biotechnology in the first of four "deliberative plenary sessions" at their meeting last month.

The deliberative session was thus meant to open up a major area of contemporary social ethical, ecological and ideological concern and to elicit an initial round of reactions from Central Committee members. One of those responding during the discussions, Annathale -bayasekera [first letter of last name illegible] (Anglican, Sri Lanka), thanked the presenters for "shocking me out of my complacency."

...citing a warning by distinguished scientists that a careless use of genetic engineering "could lead to irreversible, devastating damage to the ecology," the presentation noted that "the biotechnology industry is preparing to release scores of genetically engineered viruses, bacteria, plant strains and 'transgenic animals' into the environment in the next few years."

...Concern was expressed that without international laws regarding such release, Third World countries will become the dumping place for these materials, just as they are often the destination of toxic wastes whose disposal is illegal in the industrialized countries where they are created.

"A new and frightening arms race" was how the presentation described the military applications of genetic engineering. Not only does the application of recent discoveries make possible the production of great quantities of biological warfare agent in a short time, but it also permits the creation of horrifying new substances. Scientists have spoken of the possibility of cloning 'selective toxins' that affect specific racial or ethnic groups who are predisposed to certain diseases.

Apparently more benign uses of biotechnology - in producing high yields of agricultural products like vanilla bean, palm oil or coconuts - may have serious economic consequences for farmers in the Third World. According to the presentation, each of the "many thousands of flavors, fragrances, dyes, nutrients and pharmaceuticals derived from plants grown in the Third World ... is a potential target of biotechnology research and production."

Replacing plant-derived products with laboratory developed substitutes could have a devastating effect on the market for products now estimated to bring in as much as U.S. \$10,000 million a year.

Thus, the presence of KGB agents of influence and Soviet-controlled fronts such as the Christian Peace Conference within the World Council of Churches made it possible to arrange the presentation of "scientific" papers at WCC conferences that used disinformation, distortions, and carefully constructed "concerns" to stimulate anti-Western sentiments among Third World clerics. In the case above, this was done in the name of a supposed outcry of conscience by unnamed "distinguished scientists" and subsequently publicized in an unattributed fashion by the Soviet active measures apparatus as if the article was simply reporting in a straightforward way the concerns of the hierarchy of the World Council of Churches.

Thus, the "black" (KGB), "gray" (Christian Peace Conference), and "white" (Novosti Press Agency) elements of the Soviet active measures apparatus worked together, weaving a seamless web that first planted and then spread the messages of Soviet active measures specialists, while obscuring their role in orchestrating this campaign from start to finish. This type of scenario was repeated by Soviet active measures specialists literally hundreds of times. The organizations varied tremendously, as did the themes, which were chosen for their appeal to certain target audiences. But the purposes remained the same: to stimulate anti-Western or pro-Soviet sentiments that would ultimately rebound to Soviet advantage.